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Common Schools, Uncommon Values:
Listening to the Voices of Dissent
Rosemary C. Salomonel
Freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of
substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart
of the existing order.
Justice Robert H. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
Education in America as we know it today draws its origins from the
philosophical perspectives and political objectives of the common school
reformers over a century ago. For them, mass education was a primary vehicle
for defining ourselves as a nation. Schools would develop civic virtue and a
national character through a shared set of values reflected in the school
curriculum. The common school experience, offered to all regardless of social
class or ethnic background, would assimilate the hordes of immigrants coming
to our shores and meet the emerging needs of industrialization. Individuals
across the economic spectrum, afforded education at public expense, would
both realize their own potential and support civic purposes through their
enhanced participation as informed citizens sharing a common public
philosophy. In other words, education would serve individual interests founded
in liberal philosophy as well as communitarian goals founded in both
democratic and republican theory.
As we approach the end of the twentieth century, this model of education
has come under increasing attack. Schools have become battlegrounds in what
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has been termed a national "culture war."' The public school curriculum has
served as the most visible target in these battles. Issues such as abortion, AIDS
education, sex education, multicultural education, equality for women, and
homosexual rights-the values of "tolerance" and "individual choice"
themselves-are now tearing communities apart. While some of these
challenges are founded in non-spiritual value-based belief systems, most are
religion-based.2 Organized efforts to promote prayer or a moment of silence
in the public schools have caught Congress3 and state legislatures4 in endless
political maneuvering and have captured the attention of the media.5 Attempts
by individual students to engage in private religious speech on school grounds
during the school day have forced school officials and the courts to take a fresh
1. The term as originally used referred to the dispute between Protestants and Catholics at the end
of the nineteenth century over the religious content of public education in Germany. See JAMES DAVISON
HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA xii (1991).
2. In its 1994-95 annual report, People for the American Way documented 458 incidents in 49
states of attempted "censorship," including 338 attempts to censor educational materials such as
children's books and classics of literature; health and sexuality curricula; and student plays, speeches,
publications, and programs. The remaining 120 incidents included state legislative efforts to enact
voucher initiatives, attempts to present creationism in science classes, and efforts to introduce state-
sanctioned prayer in public school classrooms. These figures represent the first time in the organization's
13-year history of reporting such attempts to influence the public school curriculum where the success
rate had reached the 50 percent mark. PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, ATTACKS ON THE FREEDOM
TO LEARN, 1994-95 REPORT 9-16 (1995).
3. Since the Supreme Court's school prayer decisions of the 1960s, Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962) (holding that recitation of prayer composed by New York Board of Regents violated
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment), and Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(declaring Bible reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools to be unconstitutional),
numerous proposals have come before Congress to amend the Constitution to permit organized prayer
or a moment of silence in public schools. The school prayer debate escalated following the Supreme
Court's 1992 decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding that public school's inclusion
of "nonsectarian" prayer in a school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause).
4. During the first six months of 1995 alone, school prayer legislation was enacted in Tennessee,
Louisiana, and Utah. See Bown v. Gwinnett County School District, 895 F. Supp. 1564 (N.D. Ga.
1995) (upholding constitutionality of Georgia's Moment of Quiet Reflection in Schools Act). Bills were
proposed in Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Virginia permitting student-
initiated or voluntary prayers at graduations and other noncompulsory school events in response to a
ruling by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. School Dist., 977 F.2d 963
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993), which approved student-led nonsectarian prayers
at a Texas high school graduation. Mark Walsh, Bills in Six States Address Student-Led Prayers, EDUC.
WK., Feb. 23, 1994, at 10.
5. See, e.g., Peter Applebome, Prayer in Public Schools? It's Nothing NewforMany, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 1994, at Al (noting that according to People for the American Way, "60 to 70 percent of
Americans respond favorably to the idea of prayer in the school"); Richard L. Berke, White House Ties
to Clarify Stand on School Prayer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1994, at Al (noting calls by newly elected
Republican leadership in the House for vote on constitutional amendment allowing individual and group
prayer in public schools and further clarifying that President Clinton preferred passage of federal law
to constitutional amendment establishing "moment of silence" during school day); Mark Walsh, Prayer
ProposalEchoes EarlierDebates Over Religion in School, EDUC. WK., Dec. 14, 1994, at6 (noting that
"while many surveys show a majority of Americans favoring a return of organized prayers to public
schools, opposition to such proposals has evolved into a core position of many civil-liberties groups,
Jewish organizations, and main-line Protestant churches, including Baptists, Presbyterians, and
Lutherans"); Pamela Coyle, The Prayer Pendulum, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 62 (citing Gallup Poll
finding that 76 percent of public high schools in South were planning prayers delivered by students at
their graduation ceremonies).
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look at the line where religion and personal expression intersect.6
The First Amendment has served as the linchpin for much of the
ideological controversy over American education.7 Specifically for religious
claimants, the inherent tension between the Free Exercise and Free Speech
Clauses on the one hand and the Establishment Clause on the other has driven
the legal debate and framed the range of policy alternatives. While courts have
been less receptive to non-religion-based claims, arguments supporting both
have drawn in part from "the individual's freedom of conscience"' as the
central liberty unifying the First Amendment clauses and in part from parental
rights stemming from the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 9 The
federal courts have become key players in this drama alongside Congress, state
legislatures and judiciaries, and local school boards.
Both Supreme Court and lower court decisions have helped shape the
framework and provide a certain terminology within which the current debate
over educational values, parental autonomy, and the role of the state has been
carried out in the broader arena of policy and politics. Courts have weighed
competing claims on the scale of constitutional norms and developed broad
standards to guide official discretion.
But the concerns over school curricula and expressive rights are merely
symptomatic of more fundamental problems plaguing education in American
society. These debates have called into question the inherently indoctrinative
function of schooling and brought under critical scrutiny the very concept of
government funded and controlled schools.10 This Article attempts to resolve
this constitutional and political dilemma by charting a middle course whereby
the relationship between education and the state can be redefined and
structurally reconfigured, but not totally severed. From this perspective,
schooling can foster a national ethos while at the same time promoting
community or group values and accommodating individual parental interests in
guiding the upbringing of their children.
Part I critically examines the origins and purposes of the common school
movement on which contemporary education is based and questions whether
the "common school" concept has continued applicability, given dramatic
changes in the political, social, and demographic landscape over the past
century. Part II lays the constitutional foundation for the discussion. It
6. See infra notes 204-219 and accompanying text.
7. The First Amendment states in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech... ." U.S.
CONST. amend. I. The first two clauses, covering religion, are commonly referred to as the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses respectively. The last is referred to as the Free Speech Clause.
8. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985).
9. The Fourteenth Amendment states in part that "No state shall... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. This concept has been referred to as the "public school monopoly." See THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
MONOPOLY (Robert B. Everhart ed., 1982).
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examines the Supreme Court's evolving ideology of schooling, from individual
rights to a values-inculcation model, and discusses how that shift has shaped
the Court's views on community control and parental decision-making. Part I
analyzes the perspective of the lower courts on specific value-laden issues
brought before them as constitutional claims. Part IV responds to concerns
raised in recent scholarship as to educational values and parental autonomy,
identifies the strengths as well as the misunderstandings in those arguments,
and debunks some of the myths surrounding both the current system of
common schooling and the implications of radical reform proposals. Finally,
this Article offers an illustrative framework that broadly defines the parameters
of a contemporary concept of education that preserves both our common and
diverse values. It suggests that the curricula of government-supported schools
should reflect a core of common values-including character traits such as
honesty and respect for authority as well as political principles such as equality
and religious tolerance-in order to maintain our national identity and thereby
preserve the Republic. However, the Article also suggests that the monolithic
view of state operated schools should be set aside in order to provide
government supported and loosely regulated alternatives, so that parents of all
socioeconomic levels can join together in choosing curricula, materials, and
pedagogical techniques which reflect diverse non-core values according to their
own preferences, whether religion-based or not.
I. ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF THE COMMON SCHOOL
Throughout the twentieth century, the concept of a government supported
and controlled educational system has garnered significant appeal for both its
benefits to society and to the individual. However, in a democratic society,
particularly where education is compulsory, the relationship between the
schools and the state is a complicated one. Schools serve as mediating
institutions interpreting the popular culture and managing the tensions among
competing values while simultaneously supporting the state. Education is both
a practical engine and a symbol for preserving national unity and identity.
This ambitious model functions most effectively and smoothly in an
idealized society whose members share a common core of values and beliefs.
While historically we have prided ourselves on our ability to cope with cultural
conflict through our simultaneous commitment to pluralism and consensus,
circumstances have changed dramatically since the days of the American
Founders. Successive waves of immigration from all parts of the globe have
rendered us increasingly more diverse in our world views while industrializa-
tion has significantly weakened family ties and church influence. As a result,
the traditional mechanisms for defining and reaching moral consensus no longer
work in the face of an ever expanding and centerless notion of moral pluralism.
Schools have served as the lightning rod in this struggle for the heart and
Vol. 14:169, 1996
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soul of America. The governance structure has rendered public education
highly political and accountable to the local electorate. While ultimate
responsibility for education resides at the state level, the daily operation of
schools is delegated to local communities with funding primarily through local
property taxes." As a result, schools not only reproduce a national identity,
but also help define community identity.
As we have grown more diverse, these two identities have clashed with
increasing frequency. And so, added to the balance of national and individual
concerns, community preferences play a key role in shaping the debate over
educational values. In fact, driving the debate over values in the schools is the
clash between individual rights to freedom of conscience and belief, including
the right of parents to control the education of their children, and the authority
of school officials to make curricular decisions that arguably reflect the
preferences and values of the community majority. Underlying this tension is
the American passion for both liberty and community, the quest for meeting




Despite his keen observations, Tocqueville was unaware of the profound
and lasting impact this dual passion would have on American schooling as
conceptualized by his contemporaries. These mid-nineteenth century reformers
had a vision of schooling whose purpose and structure have remarkably
endured dramatic social and political changes. A retrospective look at their
aspirations and philosophical beliefs along with the climate in which they
instituted reforms provides a framework for understanding and examining the
current controversies surrounding education in the United States.
Influenced by the works of nineteenth-century European educators,
particularly the Swiss educator Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi,13 the American
architects of the common school had a clear societal purpose. For Horace
11. The federal Constitution makes no mention of education, while 49 of the 50 state constitutions
(Mississippi being the exception) contain variously worded education clauses, some more explicitly
rights-based than others. See William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School
Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 602 n.29 (1994). Some merely
mandate a system of "free public schools," such as Article 11 of the New York State Constitution which
states that, "The legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools wherein all children of this state may be educated." N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § 1. Others such as
the New Jersey Constitution state that "Ithe Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support
of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools." N.J. CONSr. art. VIII, § 4. Still others
mandate a stronger commitment to education. See, e.g., WASH. CONSF. art. IX, § 1 (stating that "the
paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within
its borders without distinction or preference on account of race, color, caste, or sex.").
12. See generally ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillip Bradley ed., A.A.
Knopf 1945) (1835).
13. See FREDERICK M. BINDER, THE AGE OF THE COMMON SCHOOL, 1830-1865, at 24 (1974).
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Mann, the primary force behind the common school movement, schooling was
necessary to preserve republican institutions and to create a political communi-
ty. 4 The school was to prepare the children of all religions, classes, and
ethnic backgrounds (particularly the foreign-born) for the intelligent and
responsible exercise of citizenship. The communal isolation of newly arrived
immigrants, their low economic status, and their high rates of illiteracy posed
a threat to the vitality of the republic. The school would teach the newcomers
the proper attitudes and values of American democracy and foster an
understanding and appreciation for American social institutions.15 The school
would be common in the sense that it would be open to all free of charge, and
it would inculcate a common core of values, a "public philosophy" which
intermingled religion, politics and economics in a vision of a "redeemer
nation." 16 Only through public control could the public define this philosophy
and avoid the dangers of partisanship. 7
The goals of the common school included moral training, discipline,
patriotism, mutual understanding, formal equality and cultural assimilation."
In fact, the values reflected in the curriculum were those of mainstream
Protestantism. In his now famous Twelfth Annual Report in 1848, Mann
himself advised teachers to teach the "principles of piety, justice, and sacred
regard to truth, love to their country, humanity and universal benevolence,
sobriety, industry, frugality, chastity, moderation, and temperance, and those
other virtues which are the ornament of human society, and the basis upon
which a republican constitution is founded."19 This purportedly non-denomi-
14. See Preface to THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL 8 (Lawrence A. Cremin ed., 1957);
LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL 33 (1951). The connection between an
educated citizenry and the success of a republican form of government is reflected in the language of
clauses addressing the purposes of public education as contained in many of the initial constitutions of
states admitted between 1798 (Kentucky) and 1912 (New Mexico). DAVID TYACK, THOMAS JAMES &
AARON BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954, at 55 (1987).
15. CREMIN, supra note 14, at 44-47. It has been argued that common schooling, rather than
merely creating cultural transformation and assimilation for the poor, also had a dark side, creating
communal and intergenerational alienation. For children of the disadvantaged, schooling was "designed
to stamp out differences among students, to secure conformity to rules and regulations as defined by
teachers ... and to disconnect students from networks of personal communication. Drawn out of
communities built on emotional bonds, shared loyalties, religious affiliations, ethnic styles, and
expressive idiosyncrasies, children were then immersed in a world of alternative structures and human
processes." Barbara Finkelstein, Exploring Community in Urban Educational History, in SCHOOLS IN
CITIES: CONSENSUS AND CONFLiCT IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 309 (Donald K. Goodenow
& Diane Ravitch eds., 1983).
16. DAVID TYACK & ELISABETH HANSoT, MANAGERS OF VIRTUE: PUBLIC SCHOOL LEADERSHIP
IN AMERICA, 1820-1980, at 20 (1982).
17. CREMIN, supra note 14, at 19.
18. See CARL F. KAESrLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY, 1780-1860, at 116 (1983).
19. THE REPUBLIC AND THE SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 106. This Protestant-republican ideology
was clearly represented in the McGuffey Readers which were first published in 1836 and used by some
200 million school children between 1900 and 1940. These were "frankly moralistic.... Honesty and
industry... [were] the leading values, closely followed by courage, kindness, obedience, and courtesy.
The Readers supported the temperance movement but were silent about the movements to abolish slavery
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national ethic, along with Bible readings "without comment, "-readings that
relied on individual interpretation rather than on the Catholic practice of
looking to the Church for understanding of the scriptures-provided the
necessary moral grounding. At the same time, the schools would avoid
controversial topics that would prove emotionally and intellectually divisive.'a
The reformers understood well the political limits of transposing any form
of standardization or state-imposed ideology onto the individualistic American
culture. And so they attempted to strike a tolerable balance between individual
and collective goals while meeting their own nationalistic objectives. State
government would maintain final authority over education by providing
minimum standards and assuring equal educational opportunity.21 By 1850,
the majority of state legislatures had established the office of the state
superintendent of education. This office became significant in future years as
a mechanism for expanding state regulatory authority. ' On the other hand,
the reformers also addressed the inherent threat they perceived in homogeneity.
As a bulwark against state encroachment on individual rights and liberties, they
attempted to inculcate a sense of community that would function not as a
deterrent to individualism but as a setting within which individuality might be
preserved.' Recognizing the widespread concern over who would establish
the dominant ideology to be promoted in the schools, the reformers emphasized
local control over education. This political structure would maintain the
transmission of political, economic, and social knowledge in the hands of each
community.24
In its early days, the common school in concept and in practice met its
strongest opposition from the Catholic Church. Prior to its inception, many
charity schools for the poor run by religious groups had received government
funds. Such schools were operated by Methodists, Catholics, Episcopalians and
other denominations in New York City until 1825, in Lowell, Massachusetts
through the 1830s and 1840s, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin through the 1840s, and
and to establish trade unions." MICHAEL W. KIRST, WHO CONTROLS THE SCHOOLS? AMERICAN VALUES
IN CoNFUcr 28 (1984).
20. CREMIN, supra note 14, at 219. The historian Carl Kaestle argues that this avoidance of
controversy or alternatives to the moral world of the school would last through the mid-twentieth century
where a "rather standard and uncontroversial moral education existed in most tax-supported
schools.... The strategy was to be inclusive by being uncontroversial.... Yet [this strategy]
contained the seeds of major discontent." It both alienated those who believed that school morality
should be "more central and more anchored in a distinctive religious view" while never escaping its
roots in a "white, middle-class, Anglo-American, Protestant tradition." Carl F. Kaestle, Moral
Education and Common Schools inAmerica:A Historian's View, 13J. MORAL EDuC. 101, 107-08 (May
1984).
21. CREMIN, supra note 14, at 81.
22. Id. at 176-77.
23. Joel Spring, The Evolving Political Structure of American Schooling, in THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
MONOPOLY 84 (Robert B. Everhart & Clarence J. Karier eds., 1982).
24. Id. at 88.
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in Hartford, Connecticut as late as the 1860s.1 But as the numbers of
Catholics migrating to the United States in the 1830s and 1840s swelled, the
divergence in viewpoints on education between Catholics and Protestants
became manifest.' The Philadelphia Bible Riots of 184427 along with the
unsuccessful attempts of the Catholic clergy in New York City to obtain a
portion of the common school fund for the maintenance of a separate system
of Catholic schools' directly challenged the "pan-Protestant hegemony" over
American culture.29
The New York experience sheds light on the irreconcilability of Catholic
and Protestant perspectives. Catholic leaders argued that the nonsectarian or
common religion taught in the public schools was actually "sectarianism in
disguise."3" They maintained that the reading of the Protestant version of the
Bible in the schools coupled with objectionable remarks directed toward
Catholics in school textbooks created a situation in which Catholics' rights of
conscience were being "wantonly violated." 31 Merely purging books of
"missionary Protestantism" masked as general morality would not suffice.
Ultimately, the "incidental hidden curriculum" would surface in the attitudes
of teachers and peers.32 Catholics were warned that "evils of the gravest kind
are likely to result from the so-called public schools." 33 The most outspoken
separatists among them, including Archbishop Hughes of New York,
challenged the very premise underlying the common school movement, that
moral education could be separated from religious beliefs. 4 Catholics aligned
with other localists in arguing that the common school infringed on parental
responsibility and was an "inefficient and improper monopoly."35 These
arguments which supported the importance of parental authority in education
25. KAESTLE, supra note 18, at 166.
26. HUNTER, supra note 1, at 69. During the 1830s, 600,000 Catholics migrated to the United
States, followed by 1,700,000 in the 1840s and 2,600,000 more in the 1850s. Of these, 43 percent were
from Ireland, 26 percent from Germany, 17 percent from England, Scotland, and Wales, and the
remainder from Italy and Eastern Europe. By the late 1880s, the number of Catholics in the United
States had reached over 6 million.
27. LLOYD P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NoN-PUBLIc SCHOOL 76 (1987).
28. See CREMIN, supra note 14, at 165-75.
29. During this same period, Protestant clergy played a key role in the formation of the common
school. In Massachusetts, five of the eight members of the State Board of Education under Horace
Mann's leadership were ministers. Mann's successor was the Reverend Barnas Sears, President of the
Newton Theological Institution. Protestant ministers served as school superintendents throughout the
country. In Kentucky, of the first eleven superintendents during the periods from 1838 to 1879, all but
one were Protestant clergymen. In the West, school classes were often held in church buildings or
church services were held in school buildings. JORGENSON, supra note 27, at 31-54.
30. ROBERT MICHAELSON, PIETY IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL 87 (1970).
31. CREMIN, supra note 14, at 166.
32. CARL F. KAEsrLE, THE EVOLUTION OFAN URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: NEW YORK CITY, 1750-
1850, at 154 (1973).
33. HUNTER, supra note 1, at 200.
34. KAESrLE, supra note 18, at 168.
35. Id. at 169.
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and the salutary effects of competition would be echoed over a century later by
modem-day reformers from the political left to the religious right.
But Catholic efforts in New York to diversify the public school curriculum
or to obtain public funding for an alternative system of Catholic schools failed
in the face of strident opposition mounted not only by the anti-Catholic Know-
Nothing Party but also by the mainstream Protestant press.3 6 This raging
controversy between Catholics and Protestants resulted in state legislation
enacted in 1842 which expressly prohibited the granting of public funds to any
school in which "any religious sectarian doctrine or tenet shall be taught,
inculcated, or practiced." 37 Anti-Catholic sentiment continued in 1894 with
the adoption of a state constitutional amendment which prohibited public aid
to any school "wholly or in part under the control or direction of any religious
denomination or in which any denominational tenet or doctrine is taught."3"
As a result, the dissenters of the time decided to opt out of the public school
system entirely rather than to compromise their own beliefs.
The issue of government aid to religiously affiliated schools continued to
percolate beneath the surface of political debate with periodic eruptions in state
legislatures and federal courts depending on the direction of the political winds.
Nevertheless, the "cosmopolitan solution" that was based on a common Anglo-
American Protestant culture39 combined with the splintering of dissident
religious groups laid to rest any direct challenges to the common school for
that time. In fact, by 1920 nearly six thousand parochial Catholic schools were
educating 1,700,000 students; more than a thousand Lutheran schools, six
hundred Seventh-Day Adventist schools, and hundreds of other sectarian
schools representing various denominations were educating hundreds of
thousands more.40 Yet unlike modem-day religious dissenters, even those who
rejected the public schools did not object on moral grounds, as they essentially
shared the values promoted in the public schools. Their objections were
founded more directly in blatant bias against them and in a difference in
theological perspective that was unrelated to the question of morals per se.
Despite this distinction, according to the historian Diane Ravitch, the
36. See HUNTER, supra note 1, at 199. According to The Watchman, a Baptist weekly, "If the
children of Papists are really in danger of being corrupted in the Protestant schools of enlightened, free
and happy America, it may be well of their conscientious parents and still more conscientious priests,
to return them to the privileges of their ancestral homes, among the half-tamed boors of Germany."
JORGENSON, supra note 27, at 107 (quoting The Watchman). The common school movement was
inextricably bound up with the "nativism" movement of the 1830s and 1840s. The latter movement was
imbued with an anti-foreign and specifically anti-Catholic spirit, culminating in the Know-Nothing
campaigns of the 1850s. Id. at 28.
37. WaLAM KAMER DUNN, WHAT HAPPENED To RELIGIOUS EDUCATION? 253-54 (1958).
38. N.Y. CONsr. art. XI, § 3; see also MICHAELSON, supra note 30, at 88-89.
39. Kaestle, supra note 20, at 101, 105.
40. Charles L. Glenn, 'Molding' Citizens, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RENEWAL OF PUBLIc
EDUCATION 25, 53 (Richard John Neuhaus ed., 1987).
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Catholic controversy in New York City bears contemporary applicability,
representing a tension between competing visions of the common school that
would recur again and again over the years, especially in the form of litigation.
As Ravitch describes it, on the one hand there is a vision of schooling in which
the public school belongs to the community, whose majority can determine the
purpose and content of education-including sectarianism. That was the view
espoused by the Catholic Church during the New York City common school
struggle. On the other hand, there is the vision espoused by Horace Mann and
the common school reformers whereby the public school belongs to the state.
Here the role of the school is to "encourage inquiry, not to impose interpreta-
tions." The school must avoid promoting any particular religious or political
view, but instead teach only commonly held values.41
After the turn of the century and through the mid-1900s, a competing view
of education, different from both of these visions, took hold. This view was
more genuinely secular and child-centered. Under the American pragmatists,
led by John Dewey, the primary locus of education in America shifted from the
church and the family to the public school. Gradually, "the religious function
shaded into the patriotic and the achievement of a broad objective of moral
goodness into the nurturing of good citizens."42 Dewey considered the school
to be a social and transformative institution. The object of education was not
to reproduce a static culture through the teaching of morals in an authoritarian
sense as espoused by the common school reformers. On the contrary, he
viewed education as serving a "cultural revision" function 3 where the moral
was synonymous with the social and could be learned by doing rather than
through direct instruction. For Dewey and his followers, the common
experience of the school would develop a common faith that would transcend
individual and group differences without negating the latter. Schooling would
promote a sense of community awareness and further community progress."
Incorporated into their notion of community was a recognition of cultural
differences, including language, literature, cultural ideals, moral and spiritual
outlook, and religion, although Dewey disagreed with efforts to infuse religion
per se into the public school.45
Despite its widespread appeal over the course of decades, by the mid-
1900s, progressive education began to fall into cyclical disfavor alternating
with more traditional approaches to education. The first shift took place in the
late 1950s with the launching of Sputnik by the U.S.S.R. and the race to
compete on every front with the Soviet Union. Here educators moved from
41. DLANE RAvrrcH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS: NEW YORK CrrY, 1805-1973, at 61-62 (1974).
42. MICHAELSON, supra note 30, at 62-63.
43. TONi MARIE MASSARO, CONSTrItTIONAL LITERACY 25-26 (1993).
44. MICHAELSON, supra note 30, at 144.
45. Id. at 146-48.
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teaching the whole child to a decided emphasis on excellence.' Economists
began to talk about education as investment in human capital for the good of
society.47 By the mid-1960s, the pendulum swung back again to progressivism
with the civil rights and anti-war movements and the War on Poverty which
challenged both traditional assumptions of life and society and the apparent
competitiveness and achievement orientation that had crept into schooling.4 8
By the mid-1970s, however, declining scores on standardized achievement
tests, increasing dropout rates, and student violence-all the perceived ills of
American education-were laid again at Dewey's door, blaming his theories for
the permissiveness, valuelessness, and lack of academic standards in the public
schools.4 9 Progressive teaching methods such as the New Math and the New
Social Studies together with the open classroom and unconventional elective
courses generated a backlash and ushered in the Back to Basics movement. By
the late-1970s, the influence of that movement, supported by a rising tide of
religious fundamentalism, became manifest in textbooks and curricula across
the country.'0 Thus began the present era in which, on an academic level,
school officials combine the best lessons learned from the two competing
philosophies. However, on a philosophical and political level, they must
constantly readjust to the cultural dissonance in the larger society and to the
shifting political and constitutional views on the purposes, governance
structure, and substance of education.
B. The Contemporary Landscape
While Mann and Dewey espoused very different visions of schooling, they
shared the belief that education would develop a common faith, albeit through
markedly different processes, one imposed by the school and the other through
interaction and rational thought. However, each drew his vision on a landscape
far different from that of contemporary America. In their day, a narrow range
of socially and politically acceptable values rendered consensus within the
realm of possibility. In recent decades, as the United States has become more
diverse in composition, controversy has developed over the values reflected in
the curriculum and permitted to be voiced in the public school context. At no
other time in our history have we witnessed such a direct challenge to the very
46. DANE RAVITCH, THE SCHOOLS WE DESERVE: REFLECTIONS ON THE EDUCATIONAL CRISES
OF OUR TIMES 82-83 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 13
(1961) (maintaining that human skills and knowledge are form of capital in which society ought to invest
for general welfare).
48. RAVITCH, supra note 46, at 84-85.
49. Id. at 88-89.
50. FRANCES FrrzoERALD, AMERICA REVISED: HISTORY SCHOOLBOOKS IN THE TwENTi1
CENTURY 192-94 (1979). Some historians maintain that the indictments leveled against Dewey in the
1950s and again in the 1970s misrepresented Dewey's philosophy and further exaggerated its impact on
schooling. See Kaestle, supra note 20, at 107.
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premise underlying what has been called the "myth of the common school,"
that is, that the values promoted through public education are in fact "neutral,
nonsectarian, and indeed obvious to any reasonable person." 51
In fact, for many the concept of non-sectarian morality is itself an
oxymoron. It is widely believed, although hotly disputed, that moral principles
must be grounded in some cultural tradition and some transcendent values. The
real dilemma for the United States is how to adapt this idea to the schools of
a pluralist society in which the Constitution, the fundamental social contract,
prohibits an established church but also protects dissent.
Today, critics across the political spectrum decry the "valuelessness" of
public schooling.52 They argue that without consensus on how children and
youth can be shaped into adulthood, schools cannot tend to moral education.53
In an effort to remain value-neutral and thus avoid the controversies engen-
dered by diversity, schools have ceased to provide us with a "moral compass"
as a nation. The rising rate of juvenile crime and a perceived decline in public
values as evidenced by scandals from Washington to Wall Street have fanned
the flames of discontent. Educators across the nation are working their way
through the political and pedagogical minefields that surround "values
education" to create programs that will affect character. From the Character
Education Partnership launched in 1992" to a White House Conference on
moral education, 55 to congressional action funding character education pilot
projects,56 to state legislation mandating values education,' there is a
51. CHARLES L. GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL 12 (1988).
52. Most commentators accept the view that education is inherently indoctrinative and value-laden,
irrespective of whether they support the recognition of First Amendment freedoms in the public school
setting. See infra notes 72-82 and accompanying text.
53. James S. Coleman, Changes in the Family and Implications for the Common School, 1991 U.
CIm. LEGAL F. 153, 158-59.
54. Members of the partnership include the American Association of School Administrators, the
American Federation of Teachers, the National Association of Secondary School Principals, the National
Education Association and the National School Boards Association. According to their Mission
Statement their purpose is to develop "civic virtue and moral character in American youth for a more
compassionate and responsible society." They define "civic virtue" as "living by the guiding principles
of our nation's framing documents, the rights and responsibilities that are at the heart of our common
compact as citizens," and they define "moral character" as "living by core values widely held in our
society such as honesty, fairness, integrity and respect." Mission Statement of The Character Education
Partnership, Inc. (adopted by C.E.P. Board of Directors on Feb. 6, 1993) (on file with author).
55. See Millicent Lawton, Values Education:A Moral Obligation orDilemma?, EDUC. WK., May
17, 1995, at 1. The conference, held in May 1995, was sponsored by the Communitarian Network and
George Washington University.
56. The Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.103-382, § 10103, authorized up
to ten grants of as much as $1 million each to state agencies to join into a partnership with at least one
local school district in implementing a character education pilot project. Section 103-382(d) (1) of the
Act requires that projects funded under the Act must incorporate at least the following elements of
character: caring, civic virtue and citizenship, justice and fairness, respect, responsibility, and
trustworthiness.
57. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-16-111 (Michie 1993) ("Curricula in morals, manners,
patriotism, and business and professional integrity shall be included in the course of study for the state
public schools."); IND. STAT. ANN. § 20-10.1-4-4 (Bums 1995) ("Each public and nonpublic school
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groundswell of support for consciously developing character in the public
schools.58
These efforts reject the moral relativism and the emphasis on the individual
found in the values clarification movement of the 1960s 9 and the cognitive
moral development movement of the 1970s ° in favor of more direct teaching
of common "core" values. Obviously, the difficult question remains: "Whose
values?" Adding to the tensions are the debates surrounding efforts to break
what some perceive as the "Eurocentric bias" of the traditional curriculum as
well as issues raised by those who equate traditional values with certain
religious beliefs.
Critics on the political left oppose any suggestion of religion or religious
speech in the public schools, yet argue for a broader range of secular values
and perspectives, some more controversial than others, to be reflected in the
curriculum. Critics on the political right argue that schools cannot teach virtue
without relating moral values to a particular worldview,61 and that the values
currently represented in the curriculum are so secular as to convey a message
of hostility toward religion and, in certain cases, directly offend religious
beliefs.62
Religious dissenters in particular have raised their voices to a feverish pitch
seeking accommodation to their religious beliefs both inside and outside of the
public school system. From inside, they challenge the pervasive secularism of
the curriculum, the traditional exclusion of religious rationales from the public
teacher, employed to instruct in the regular courses of the first twelve (12) grades, shall present his
instruction with special emphasis on honesty, morality, courtesy, obedience to law, respect for the
national flag, the constitutions of the United States and of Indiana, respect for parents and the home,
the dignity and necessity of honest labor and other lessons of a steadying influence, which tend to
promote and develop an upright and desirable citizenry.").
58. See THOMAS LICKONA, EDUCATING FOR CHARACrER 51 (1991).
59. The purpose of values clarification was to help students clarify their own values rather than to
teach them fixed notions of right and wrong. See SIDNEY B. SIMON Er AL., VALUES CLARIFICATION:
HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR TEACHERS AND STUDENTS 16 (1972) (suggesting that there
is no consistency concerning what constitutes "desirable" values given various influences on students'
lives-parents, teachers, the church, peer groups, the media-and implying that these influences and
values that young people assimilate from them are of equal value).
60. A similar theory that gained popularity in the 1970s was based on six successive stages through
which individuals arguably pass in moral development. Students are presented with "moral dilemmas"
which they evaluate from what are defined within the underlying theory as progressively more advanced
perspectives. The six stages from the lowest to the highest are: punishment and obedience; individual
instrumental purpose and exchange; mutal interpersonal expectations, relationships, and conformity;
social system and conscience maintenance; prior rights and social contract utility; and universal ethical
principles. See generally LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1981).
Lawrence Kohlberg, the architect of this movement, estimated that only five percent of the American
population reaches the highest developmental stage, indicating that moral development is not
"inevitable" but depends on experience. Id. at 88. Similar to values clarification, this "cognitive-
developmental" approach rejects moralizing and focuses on the process of moral reasoning rather than
on a particular product.
61. Richard A. Baer, Jr., American Public Education and the Myth of Value Neutrality, in
DEMOCRACY AND THE RENEWAL OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 1, 9 (Richard John Neuhaus ed., 1987).
62. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
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school experience, and the widespread intolerance or fear of even private
religious expression on public school grounds. From outside, they join in a
chorus with other parental rights advocates to press for enhanced choice in the
form of government vouchers to support alternatives to the public school.
On the national level, religious and social conservatives are calling for an
amendment to the federal Constitution which they argue will restore religious
equality. The purpose of such an amendment is to allow non-denominational
or citizen-initiated prayer in non-compulsory settings.' Religious conserva-
tives have further introduced legislation providing tuition vouchers to be used
at private schools, including those that are religiously affiliated,6 and even
a "parental rights act" that would clarify the "right of parents to direct the
upbringing of their children," which includes overseeing their education.' At
the state level, a number of state legislatures are considering a "parents' rights"
amendment to their state constitutions. Supporters maintain that such an
amendment would insure that the values taught in school are not in conflict
with values taught in the home.' In recent years, interest groups on both
63. S.J. Res. 24, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The amendment provides that "It]he right of
citizens of the United States to the free exercise of religion shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State." Id.
64. H.R. 1640, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), the Low-Income School Choice Demonstration Act
of 1995, authorizes the appropriation of $30 million for fiscal year 1996 to create demonstration projects
that would provide "financial assistance to low-income parents to select the public or private schools
their children will attend."
65. S. 984, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), the Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act of 1995,
provides that: "No Federal, State, or local government, or any official of such a government acting
under color of law, shall interfere with or usurp the right of a parent to direct the upbringing of the child
of the parent."
Under the proposal, once a parent initially demonstrates that the government has interfered with or
usurped the right of the parent to direct the upbringing of a child, the burdens of production and
persuasion shift to the government to demonstrate that the method of intervention or usurpation is the
"least restrictive means" of accomplishing a "compelling governmental interest." The proposal further
notes that parents have rights but also have responsibilities to "see that their children are educated, for
the purposes of literacy and self-sufficiency," citing the Supreme Court's decision in Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See also H.R. 1946, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), fora similar proposal
noting that "the Supreme Court has regarded the right of parents to direct the upbringing of their
children as a fundamental right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty within the 14th amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, as specified in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)." See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text for
a discussion of these decisions.
66. Mark Walsh, Conservative Group Backs Parent-Rights Amendment, EDUC. WK., Mar. 22,
1995, at 13. A Virginia-based organization, Of the People, has developed a model amendment and found
sponsors in 24 states. The amendment states that "[t]he right of parents to direct the upbringing and
education of their children shall not be infringed" and that "the legislature shall have power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." Id. According to materials distributed by the
group, the amendment "will make public schools more accountable by giving parents a greater role in
shaping public school curriculum, providing consistency with mainstream values, and greater access to
textbooks, materials and records" and will strengthen "efforts to enact public school choice." OF THE
PEOPLE, THE PARENTAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT TO STATE CONSTITTIONS (March 1995). Elliot
Mineberg, the legal director of People for the American Way, looks more critically at the amendment,
arguing that it "is either unnecessary or it would seriously conflict with the current legal notion of
parental rights and responsibilities" creating confusion about the validity of laws such as those
prohibiting child abuse or requiring child vaccinations. Walsh, supra, at 13.
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sides of this contentious debate have mobilized to spread their views to public
school authorities through bulletins, letters, and even videotapes. 67 As parents
and religious groups have increasingly come to use the political and legal
processes to gain control over the education of their children, they lay bare the
inherent conflict between the presumed homogeneity in values underlying the
"common school" as originally conceived and the reality of our "uncommon
values" a hundred years later.
At the heart of this debate over values is the indoctrinative function of
schooling, a complicated and controversial concept in itself. Undeniably, both
the overt and the hidden curriculum affect the transmission of culture as well
as the formation of student beliefs and world views. Whether it is the textbooks
used; the governance structure of the school (hierarchical or democratic); the
extra-curricular activities offered (from karate, hockey, or chess to ballet); the
role models that teachers provide including their mode of dress and affect; the
importance, substance, and use of exams; the behavior and demeanor that is
rewarded or punished; the layout of the classrooms (lecture or seminar
style)-these factors are all value-laden.
The permissible scope of the state's indoctrinative power raises several
fundamental questions of political and constitutional magnitude: Which values
should be inculcated? Which values must be inculcated? Which values must not
be inculcated? And who should make those decisions? Much of this debate
turns on the compulsory nature of schooling 68 and the related notion that
students are a "captive audience." 69 As Mark Yudof has noted, "In some
67. In December 1993, The American Center for Law and Justice, the legal advocacy group
founded by Pat Robertson, disseminated a letter on religious-freedom issues to 15,000 school
superintendents across the country. The American Civil Liberties Union countered with a bulletin
distributed to superintendents across the country clarifying its legal views on issues such as graduation
prayer and religious-holiday parties. The ACLU has also produced a video-tape for educators, entitled
"America's Constitutional Heritage," in response to a similar tape produced by fundamentalist Christian
organizations, entitled "America's Godly Heritage." Mark Walsh, Schools Get Free 'Legal Advice' on
Religious-Freedom Issues, EDUC. WK., Dec. 15, 1993, at 9.
68. See Stanley Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy:" Value Training
in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REv. 15, 30 ("Classroom instruction reflects value judgments.
These judgments in tm significantly affect the child's self-image and view of society. The very fact of
compulsory education compromises a child's autonomy .... We must... distinguish between, on the
one hand, the need to make educational choices, and the danger of indoctrination, propaganda, and
censorship on the other."); Stanley Ingber, Religious Children and the Inevitable Compulsion of Public
Schools, CASE W. RES. L. REv. 773,786 (1993) ("The entire concept of compulsory education is based
upon the assumption that there are times when the state, rather than the parent, may decide which
perspectives the child ought to confront.... [C]ompulsory education traditionally has been justified as
a mechanism to expose children to ideas that will enable them to advance beyond the home and
transcend the prejudices of the past.").
69. See MARK G. YuDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 213 (1983) ("[S]ome aspects of
communication in public schools, particularly the existence of a captive audience, should make courts
solicitous of individual First Amendment rights that reduce the power of government to persuade without
seriously compromising its affirmative obligation to promote liberty.") (footnotes omitted); Mary-
Michelle Upson Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a Right to Have One's
Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 871, 906 (1977) ("For at least ten
years, most children spend a significant part of each weekday in public schools. They are likely to be
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ways, public schools are a communications theorist's dream: the audience is
captive and immature... the messages are labeled as educational (and not as
advertising) ... and a system of rewards and punishments is available to
reinforce the messages." 7° These factors must be weighed against the judicial
deference afforded local school officials in the name of federalism, judicial
restraint, and lack of judicial expertise."' Commentators have analyzed the
inculcative nature of schooling from two diametrically opposed perspectives,
one focusing on student rights to freedom of conscience and the other on
school governance. According to the first, students must be protected from
state indoctrination and the establishment of uniform values especially of a
religious' or political nature.73 The formation and expression of beliefs are
intertwined and so both should be free from government coercion. 74 Rather,
individual students and parents should determine the values taught in the
schools.75 A broad state indoctrinative interest in using schools as the vehicle
for inculcating values chosen by the local community and reflecting
majoritarian preferences is inconsistent with the "constitutional ideal of citizen
self-government., 76
The second view, although representing a range of deference to school
decision-making, generally shifts the balance in favor of school authority to
inculcate values that reflect those of the local community and/or the larger
society. One approach suggests that schools may promote broad values
considered essential to a democratic constitutional system such as tolerance of
far more susceptible to indoctrination than adults, since most adults have formed attitudes and views of
their own which give them a better basis upon which to resist indoctrination.").
70. YUDOF, supra note 69, at 213 (footnote omitted).
71. See Brian A. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in the
Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HASINGS CONSr. L.Q. 1, 70 (1984)
(arguing that judicial intervention in school cases is permissible only in rare cases as courts lack
democratic accountability and educational expertise).
72. George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 863, 911
(1988) (maintaining that, while education by nature promotes some values while denying others, in
absence of societal consensus concerning values, teaching of values per se cannot override religious
freedom).
73. RobertD. Kamenshine, The FirstAmendment's Implied PoliticalEstablishment Clause, 67 CAL.
L. REV. 1104, 1134 (1979) (arguing that there is no societal interest in schools inculcating "political"
values, as "uniformly acceptable" political values do not exist; groups outside school (family, religious
organizations) are more capable of inculcating values in young people); see also Tyll van Geel, The
Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REv. 197,
297 (1983) (arguing on basis of empirical social science evidence that state has no compelling interest
in value inculcation, as such inculcation does not promote compelling governmental goals, and further
suggesting a "fairness principle" whereby whenever school curriculum presents political or moral issue
in curriculum, both sides must be adequately presented).
74. See STEPHEN ARONS, COMPELLING BELIEF: THE CULTURE OF AMERICAN SCHOOLING 205-06
(1983).
75. See Stephen Arons & Charles Lawrence III, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First
Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 309, 313 (1980).
76. Walter A. Kamiat, Note, State Indoctrination and the Protection of Non-State Voices in the
Schools: Justifying a Prohibition of School Library Censorship, 35 STAN. L. REv. 497, 502 (1983).
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religious differences.' Commentators embracing a more comprehensive
approach maintain that education is in fact a legitimate governmental presence
in the "sphere of the intellect and spirit,"78 that historically we have accepted
that presence,79 and that schools as unique "mediating structures" linking the
young to the local community and larger society make curricular decisions that
should be upheld as long as they are rational."o Some even suggest that
neither students nor teachers enjoy a First Amendment presumptive right to use
the schools as a forum for personal expression."' A related view ascribes a
more affirmative duty on the part of schools to inculcate certain ethical, moral,
or religious values, suggesting that the schools' failure to do so is, in fact,
value-laden in itself, promoting a secularistic ideology.'
These opposing arguments touch the very essence of schooling as it has
come to be known over the past century. When raised in the political arena,
they often rise to a feverish pitch, so as to illustrate that the battle lines are
increasingly drawn on irreconcilable world views and issues of cultural
identity. Whether tied to religion and concepts of "ultimacy" or based in moral
or philosophical beliefs, these conflicts center on issues about which people feel
profoundly and disagree sharply. As such, they are not amenable to political
compromise and so they ultimately seek a constitutional resolution in the
federal courts.
77. Nadine Strossen, "Secular Humanism" and "Scientific Creationism": Proposed Standards for
Reviewing Curricular Decisions Affecting Students' Religious Freedom, 47 OmHO ST. L.J. 333, 375-76
(1986).
78. JOSEPH TUSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MmD 85 (1977).
79. Stephen R. Goldstein, TheAsserted ConstitutionalRight ofPublic School Teachers toDetermine
What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1350 (1976).
80. Bruce C. Hafen, Developing StudentExpression Thr7oughInstitutionalAuthority:Public Schools
as Mediating Structures, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 663, 670 (1987).
81. Malcolm Stewart, The FirstAmendment, the Public Schools, and the Inculcation of Community
Values, 18 J. L. & EDUC. 23, 29 (1989).
82. See Michael W. McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, andEducational Choice: What
Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. C. LEGAL F. 123, 142 (arguing that "public
values" inculcated through public school curriculum do not reflect values shared by majority of
American public but are rather values held by "secular minority"); Mary Harter Mitchell, Secularism
in Public Education: The Constitutional Issues, 67 B.U. L. REV. 603 (1987) (exploring various theories
through which parents can challenge indoctrinative function of public schools, using secular humanism
as focus of discussion); Paul James Toscano, A Dubious Neutrality: The Establishment of Secularism
in the Public Schools, 1979 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 203 (arguing that religious neutrality, as required by
Supreme Court doctrine, is not possible in educational setting and that this approach has created "base
for ideological discrimination that tends toward contracted, compelled, and conformist secular world
view"); Warren A. Ward, Rethinking Indoctrination, EDUC. WK., May 25, 1995, at 44 (arguing that
public education is form of secular indoctrination in that it excludes religious ways of thinking by failing
to provide intellectual and emotional resources needed for students to learn to give religion serious
consideration, thus making religious accounts of the world appear "implausible, even inconceivable");
Paul Vitz, Religion and Traditional Values in Public School Textbooks, 84 PUB. INTEREST 79, 82-84
(1986) (arguing that several widely used textbooks downgraded traditional family values by defining
family as "'a group of people,'" failing to emphasize marriage as foundation of family, and considering
one-parent family as no better or worse than any other family structure, while at same time totally
excluding any discussion of importance of religion in American history).
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II. A VIEW FROM THE COURT
In the past three decades, the Supreme Court has played a key role in
shaping educational policy through constitutional interpretation. Again and
again, the Court has attempted to resolve the tensions among liberty,
community, and equality in schooling and to balance the interests of individual
students and families against those of the local community and the larger
society. The Court's evolving views on these issues have created the backdrop
against which lower courts, policy makers, school officials, litigators, and
interest groups have attempted to fill in the details in understanding freedom
of conscience in the modem-day "common school."
Over the years, the Supreme Court has selectively drawn from the legacy
of Mann and Dewey in attempting to reconcile the conflicting goals and
expectations of public education. Rather than developing a coherent and stable
theory of schooling, however, the Court has articulated a general view of
education which has shifted emphasis from a rights-based to a values-based
ideology over time. In particular, the focus has shifted from parental and
student rights based in the First and Fourteenth Amendments, to the authority
of school officials to make curricular and administrative determinations that
reflect community and societal values. That shift has reflected in part a
changing Court membership and in part changing social pressures and popular
attitudes.
A. Parental Rights
The modem day parents-rights movement draws from a trilogy of Supreme
Court decisions that provide the foundation for contemporary claims by parents
to control the education of their children free from state intrusion. Despite
significant rulings and powerful dicta that are frequently cited by both
claimants and lower courts, recent history has proven these cases to be of
limited applicability. Two cases dating from the 1920s are based on Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process doctrine;u yet, in recent years, the
doctrine's balancing test has frequently weighed in favor of school authority
and against parental discretion. The third relevant Court decision, based on the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, has been swallowed up by its
83. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1 states in part that, "No State shall... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ... ." The concept of substantive due process
permits the courts to review the substance of governmental actions regardless of the process by which
the decision was made. Developed by the Court in the late nineteenth century to overturn economic
legislation, substantive due process has its philosophical roots in natural law theory maintaining that
certain rights exist in every society, whether through social contract or divine right, and the state cannot
impair these without a compelling justification. JOHN E. NOwAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTONAL LAW § 11.1, at 361 (5th ed. 1995).
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exceptions.
The first decision in this trilogy is Meyer v. Nebraska.'I In that case, the
Court invalidated a state law making it a criminal offense to teach a subject in
a language other than English to any student attending a public or private
school who had not completed the eighth grade. The statute, one of 37 similar
laws enacted during and immediately following World War I, was symptomatic
of deeper feelings of nativism, hysteria, and suspicion of foreigners.' These
negative feelings worked their way into governmental policies directed
particularly toward the German-speaking population which had clung to its
language and culture perhaps more tenaciously than other immigrant groups.
Lutheran-sponsored schools where classes were often taught in German were
viewed as a threat to progressive reform and to the acculturative purposes of
the common school movement.86
While Meyer specifically addressed the right of teachers to pursue their
profession, the Court also discussed the interest of parents and the interest of
the children themselves. Among the liberty interests included in the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, the Court noted the right "to acquire useful
knowledge" and the right to "establish a home and bring up children."'
Recognizing these rights, the Court determined that the Nebraska legislature
had attempted to interfere with the right of parents to control the education of
their children. 88
The Court returned to the liberty interest of substantive due process two
years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,89 striking down a state law that
declared it a misdemeanor for a parent or guardian to send a child between the
ages of eight and sixteen to a school other than the public school in the district
84. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
85. See WILLIAM G. Ross, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE
CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927, at61 (1994). During 1919 alone, nineteen states enacted laws that restricted
the teaching of foreign languages. Most of these statutes merely required that all basic subjects be taught
in English. All of them, except the New Hampshire law, applied to public schools as well as private and
parochial schools. The Ohio and Indiana statutes specifically prohibited the teaching of German in the
elementary grades. The most extreme legislation, a Louisiana statute, prohibited the teaching of the
German language in any institution including private schools and universities. See also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITrJONAL LAW 1319-20 (2d ed. 1988) (arguing that in Meyer and later in
Pierce the Court demonstrated solicitude for Germans in Nebraska and Catholics in Oregon (against
whom the statutes had been directed), thus illustrating general technique of "assessing alleged invasions
of personhood in their historical and social context").
86. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?:" Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARYL. REv. 995, 1004-05 (1992). Using Meyerand Pierce to critically examine
family law and policy, Woodhouse argues that "property-based notion of the private child" used in these
two cases has stifled "more fruitful consideration of the rights of all children to safety, nurture, and
stability, to a voice, and to membership in the national family." Id. at 1002.
87. 262 U.S. at 399.
88. Id. at 401.
89. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act has been hailed by its
supporters as a means of giving constitutional permanence to the parental rights rulings of Meyer and
Pierce. S. 984, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). See also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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where the child resided. Two private schools challenged the law. While the
Court recognized all three interests asserted by the plaintiffs-the right of
parents to choose their children's school, the right of children to influence that
choice, and the right of schools and teachers to engage in a business or
profession--the language and focus of Pierce clearly render it a parental
rights case. In an oft-quoted statement, the Court maintained that "the child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."91
Nevertheless, in a nod to state regulation of both public and private schools
and to the inculcative function of schooling, the Court acknowledged the
"power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools" and "to require that...
teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic citizenship, and that
certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and nothing
be taught which is essentially inimical to the public welfare." 91 While
surprisingly overlooked by commentators, this language carries clear
implications for mapping out the contours of the state's permissible role in
curriculum determinations. 3
A half century later, in Wisconsin v. Yoder,' the Court again addressed
parental autonomy, but this time based on religious beliefs under the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause.95 The Court referred to Pierce as "a
90. Id. at 532.
91. Id. at 535.
92. Id. at 534 (emphasis added).
93. For a more recent acknowledgement of parental rights to direct the upbringing of their children
under substantive due process, see infra notes 192-203 and accompanying text.
94. 406 U.S. 205 (1973).
95. In resolving Free Exercise claims, courts apply the Supreme Court's three-part test as
articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) to determine: (1) whether the state action
burdens a sincerely held religious belief; (2) whether a compelling interest for the state action exists;
and (3) whether the state action is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest. The Sherbert test has
been called into question by Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990), where Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, held that a compelling interest need not be shown
where the claimant is seeking an exemption from a neutral law of general applicability. However, the
Court drew an exception for "hybrid" cases such as Yoder where claimants are seeking an exemption
not on Free Exercise grounds alone but in combination with other constitutionally protected rights such
as the right of parents to direct their children's education. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. Legal scholars on
both sides of the Free Exercise accommodation debate have criticized the reasoning of Smith including
the Court's interpretation of Yoder. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free
Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CH. L. REv. 308, 309 n.3 (1991) (arguing that claim that Yoder "was
decided on the basis of a 'hybrid' constitutional ight.., is particularly illustrative of poetic license");
Michael McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the SmithDecision, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 1109, 1121
(1991) (arguing that "the opinion in Yoder expressly stated that parents do not have the right to violate
compulsory education laws for nonreligious reasons"). A wide coalition of religious and public policy
groups from both liberal and conservative camps subsequently pressed for passage of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 103-141 (1993), which states that "[the] Government shall not
substantially burden a person's free exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability." The Act restores the "least restrictive means" and the "compelling interest" tests to Free
Exercise jurisprudence by writing them into federal law.
Common Schools, Uncommon Values
charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their
children."' In Yoder, the Court upheld a challenge by Amish parents to a
state law requiring all children under the age of sixteen to attend public or
private school. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, relied heavily
upon the concept of community, here the religious or moral community' and
not the secular political community as in other Court decisions. He also
touched on the significant issues that arise when educational purposes and
values inculcation collide with values grounded in religious beliefs. The Amish
maintained that high school education would teach their children values
different from their own and would lead to the disintegration of their unique
and insular community.
The Court concluded that the education that Amish children receive from
their parents beyond the eighth grade prepared them adequately to function
both in their own agrarian society and as good citizens in the larger society.
The Court further noted that Amish education exemplified the diversity that
"we profess to admire and encourage."98 The Court acknowledged that the
purpose of education was to prepare children for life. However, it distinguished
between preparing the child for life in modem society where education for an
additional year or two beyond eighth grade may be necessary and preparing the
child for life in the separated agrarian community as required by the Amish
faith." The Court seemed to suggest here that, at least in certain circumstanc-
es, the fundamental purposes of education may vary according to the needs or
lifestyle of a particular community. The Court also appeared to acknowledge
the qualified autonomy of religious subgroups and the role they play in
American society."°
Relying on the First Amendment right to freedom of religion, the Court
held that the state lacked a sufficiently compelling justification for imposing
such a burden upon the exercise of the sincerely held religious beliefs of the
Amish. In powerful language, the Court noted, "[This case involves the
fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide
the religious future and education of their children .... This primary role of
the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate
as an enduring American tradition.""' Nevertheless, the Court made clear
that its holding turned on the religious foundation and the unique facts
96. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233.
97. Robert Douglas Chesler, Imagery of Community, Ideology ofAuthority: The Moral Reasoning
of ChiefJustice Burger, 18 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 457, 458 (1983) (defining "moral community"
as "a group of people who have chosen to live together because they share a unitary conception of the
Good").
98. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226.
99. Id. at 222.
100. Howard H. Friedman, Rethinking Free Exercise: Rediscovering Religious Community and
Ritual, 24 SErON HALL L. Rrv. 1800, 1821 (1994).
101. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232.
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surrounding the claims of the Amish. For example, it would not apply to "a
way of life and a mode of education by a group claiming to have discovered
some 'progressive' or more enlightened process for rearing children for
modem life."" In particular, the Court noted the long history of the Amish
as a successful and self-sufficient society, the sincerity of their religious beliefs,
the interrelationship of belief with their way of life, the dangers presented by
the statute as applied to the Amish, and the minimal difference between the
state's requirements and those that the Amish already accepted.
Given this very narrow contextual analysis, Yoder would come to operate
in future years on two levels of constitutional significance. While its holding
would continue to form the core of parental autonomy arguments in litigation
raising religious claims, the courts would repeatedly confine its applicability
to its unique facts. On the heels of Yoder came a cultural revolution already in
the making, a backlash to the perceived excesses of the changes wrought by
that revolution in general and progressivism in particular, and the revival and
politicization of religious fundamentalism. This sequence of social trends
brought parental rights to the fore of political and legal debate, testing the
continued vitality of Yoder. But by this time, the Court had already shifted
ground from an ideology of schooling based in individual rights to one founded
in school governance and values inculcation.
B. Student Rights
The Meyer, Pierce, Yoder trilogy represents one perspective on freedom of
conscience and belief: the right to direct the upbringing of one's children.
Implicit in these cases is a minimaization of the school's inculcative function.
A second line of Court decisions from the 1940s to the 1970s more explicitly
raises the issues of indoctrination and values inculcation to support student
rights of freedom of thought and expression. Underlying the Court's
educational opinions during these years was a progressive child-centeredness
that rested specifically on the rights of students, not of parents. Here the Court
maintained that schooling should open the intellect to new options and new
possibilities beyond those encountered in the home.1 3 Schools should be
"embryonic communities," as Dewey called them, teaching students the
principles of democracy through practice and example."t
Several cases from this period are particularly significant not only for their
grounding in freedom of speech but also for their broad dicta generally
102. Id. at 235-36.
103. LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 36-37 (1977) (describing
progressive education).
104. Theodore R. Mitchell, The High Court and Hazelwood: Chipping Away at Rights, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 25, 1988, at 12 (discussing the Court's apparent turnaround in philosophy in
Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)).
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supporting the constitutional rights of students. In West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette,r5 the Court struck down a state statute requiring
all public school students to salute the American flag. Jehovah's Witnesses
sought release from enforcement of the law because their literal interpretation
of the Bible prohibited them from saluting the flag, which they considered a
"graven image." 106 While the Court acknowledged the role played by schools
in preparing young people for democratic participation,"w the indoctrinative
function of public schooling apparently played a minor role in the Court's
overall analysis. On the other hand, in powerful language with almost limitless
potential for expansion, 08 the Court laid the foundation for the student's
right to freedom of conscience'09 or belief in an oft-quoted statement: "If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein."" ° The Court acknowledged the importance of education
as the vehicle of formation for democratic citizenship and the necessity for
"scrupulous" constitutional protection in that setting. In other words, individual
freedom of conscience is a precondition for democracy."I
In Barnette the Court first articulated a theory of "negative First Amend-
ment protection" whereby the Amendment protects not only the right to engage
in speech but also the right to refrain from government-compelled speech.12
105. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
106. Exodus 20:4-5 states:
Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven
above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth; thou shalt not
bow down thyself to them nor serve them.
107. "Mhe State [may] 'require teaching by instruction and study of all in our history and in the
structure and organization of our government, including the guaranties of civil liberty which tend to
inspire patriotism and love of country.'" Barnette, 319 U.S. at 631 (quoting Minersville School Dist.
v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 604 (1940) (Stone, C.J., dissenting)).
108. See Arons & Lawrence, supra note 75, at 319 (noting that "Bamette remains a powerful
formulation of the unconstitutionality of state-imposed orthodoxy and of the intimate relationship
between holding and expressing beliefs").
109. For a thorough analysis of the origins of the phrase "freedom of conscience" and the Supreme
Court's articulation of this interest, see Harrop A. Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U.
PA. L. REV. 806 (1958).
110. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
111. Id. at 631-32 n. 12. In a case decided almost three decades after Barnette, Wooley v. Maynard,
430 U.S. 705 (1977), the Court moved beyond its concern in Bamette with the instrumental values
served by a prohibition against coerced expression, and considered the protection of "individual
personality" as an end in itself. Leora Harpaz, Justice Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy: The Supreme Court
Struggles to Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEX. L. REv. 817, 855 (1986). While the facts of
Wooley were unrelated to education, the Court's broad dicta bears significantly on the right to freedom
of conscience. Recognizing a challenge by Jehovah's Wituesses to a New Hampshire requirement that
all license plates placed on noncommercial vehicles bear the state motto, "Live Free or Die," the Court
upheld the "right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to
foster.., an idea they find morally objectionable." Id. at 715.
112. See, e.g., David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled
Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REV. 995, 1023 (1982) (arguing that "compelled expression
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While the plaintiffs had relied on religious as well as speech grounds in their
claims, the plurality based its decision more generally on constitutional
limitations on governmental power to "invade the sphere of intellect and spirit
which is the purpose of the First Amendment.""' The Court seemed to
acknowledge the values of diversity and tolerance for the unusual or "eccen-
tric" as a benefit to society, as well as the potentially adverse consequences
that flow from coerced speech.1 4
Some commentators have referred to this model of education as the
"marketplace of ideas";1 5 others refer to it as the "discursive or analytical"
approach." 6 The Court reaffirmed this position in the late 1960s in a First
Amendment decision that represents the high-water mark of the students' rights
movement and the Court's implicit endorsement of Dewey's view that schools
should encourage students to participate in the learning process. In Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,"7 the Court struck
down a school's prohibition against students' wearing black arm bands to
protest the Vietnam War. The Court affirmed that students enjoy not only
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression in the school
setting,"' but broader fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution
as well." 9 Drawing on the marketplace imagery, the Court stated that
students may not be confined to the expression of "officially approved"
sentiments1ro In other words, the relationship between the student and the
may infringe on negative First Amendment interests in at least two ways: first, by forcing an individual
to speak ... he may be deprived of control over the personality he projects to the world; [and] second,
by compelling an individual to affirm belief contrary to his own he may be deprived of freedom of
conscience").
113. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.
114. "[W]e apply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to be intellectually
and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social organization.... We can have
intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe to exceptional minds only at the
price of occasional eccentricity and abnormal attitudes." Id. at 642.
115. Goldstein, supra note 79, at 1350; ARONS, supra note 74, at 46 (referring specifically to
relationship between teachers and students as they approach high school years where "the image of the
teacher's role is perceived to mean that students should be exposed to a variety of ideas and values").
The image of competing ideas generating robust debate can be found as far back as John Stuart Mill.
See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 1, 13-48 (R.B. McCallum ed., 1948). The concept was first introduced into American
jurisprudence in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, 3. dissenting) ("T]he
best test of the truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.").
116. Robert M. Gordon, Freedom of Erpression and Values Inculcation in the Public School
Curriculum, 13 J.L. & EDUC. 523, 531 (1984) (characterizing this approach as including "active
examination of data by both teacher and student" as well as "[reason and dialogue ... which
minimizes... coercion and indoctrination").
117. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
118. Id. at506.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 511. During this period, the Court drew on the same imagery to support the societal
benefits of free speech in a ease invalidating as vague and overbroad New York's loyalty requirements
for teachers, Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). While the facts of this case
arose in the context of higher education, the following dicta in Keyishian is often quoted in cases
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state should be "reciprocal rather than inculcative," again suggesting a
Deweyian dialectal learning process."
C. The Wzlues Inculcation Model
Progressive education later fell into disrepute as culturally relativist and
overly permissive. It was also abandoned in the 1970s as the Warren Court
turned into the Burger Court and adopted a "cultural transmission" or "values
inculcation" model of schooling which has continued into the Rehnquist Court.
This view has historical roots as far back as the 1647 Massachusetts Education
Act that had an explicit purpose to "'thwart 'Satan' by teaching children to
read the Bible and to educate youths not only in good literature, but in sound
doctrine.'" 1" Court decisions reflecting this perspective emphasize the
inculcative or indoctrinative nature of schooling for a given purpose,
maintaining that public schools not only may but should "influence their
students to adopt particular beliefs, attitudes, and values.""
This is not to suggest that the concept of schools as socializing agents was
newly conceived in the 1970s. The progressives had also recognized and
fostered the socialization function of schooling. However, they focused on
student interests as reflected in cases such as Barnette and Tinker. In contrast,
the current Court, particularly where there are First Amendment interests at
stake, looks to socialization as a mechanism both to preserve community
interests and preferences, as reflected in the decisions of elected or appointed
school officials, and to prepare students for citizenship in the larger society.
Where the Justices discuss values, they view them from two perspectives,
reaffirming the authority of school officials to uphold the values of the
community as well as the mission of schooling to promote the fundamental
values of a democratic society. This distinction bears significant implications
for rights-based challenges to the public school curriculum. 12 Elsewhere,
particularly in school desegregation and finance cases which more directly raise
governance issues, the Court has used the concept of local control over public
education to further implicitly community interests, if not values per se.lr2
addressing student rights at the elementary and secondary levels:
The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth
"out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritarian selection."
121. William B. Senhauser, Note, Education and the Court: The Supreme Court's Educational
Ideology, 40 VAND. L. REV. 939, 956 n.95 (1987).
122. Goldstein, supra note 79, at 1350 (quoting from Charters & Laws of Massachusetts Bay, ch.
88, § 3 (1814) (originally enacted in 1671)).
123. Mitchell, supra note 82, at 700.
124. See infra Part IV.
125. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973) ("Neighborhood school
systems... reflect the deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community in their public education.
... Many citizens sense ... a decline in the intimacy of our institutions-home, church, and
school-which has caused a concomitant decline in the unity and communal spirit of our people.")
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The first line of cases based on expressive rights emphasizes the moral
community, while the second based on equality concerns appears to emphasize
the political community. However, the two concepts share a common thread
in that they both imagine a group of individuals bound together by common
experiences, values, ideals, and goals.
This more recent ideology clearly emerges in three decisions from the
1980s. These decisions represent two facets of First Amendment freedom of
conscience grounded in expressive rights: the right to receive information
through the "speech" of others (e.g. published authors) and the right to express
oneself free of government constraints. The first case in this trilogy is a
transitional case between a rights-based and a values inculcation model of
schooling; the second two cases stand in stark contrast to principles articulated
in Barnette and Tinker.
Board of Education v. Hco26 is a studied lesson in Court confusion and
ambivalence. None of the seven opinions garnered majority support and the
majority vote was swayed by only one Justice. 127 Struggling to strike a
balance between students' rights and school governance without overturning the
substance of educational decisions, the Court found consensus in a procedural
resolution.
The plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan established the "right to
receive information and ideas" in the context of the school library," where
the school board had limited discretion to remove books based on educationally
relevant criteria but not based on partisan politics. 129 At the same time, the
plurality recognized the state's broad interest in indoctrinative education. Not
only are schools "vitally important 'in the preparation of individuals for
(Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 51-52 n. 108 (1973) (upholding state system of financing schools in Texas on grounds that
local control guarantees "the greatest participation by those most directly concerned"). Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974) (in striking down court-ordered metropolitan desegregation plan,
court stated that "local autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community
concern and support for public schools and to the quality of the educational process").
126. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
127. Rosemary C. Salomone, Free Speech and School Governance in the Wake ofHazelwood, 26
GA. L. REv. 253, 264 (1992). Several courts have noted the weak precedential value of Pico's "no-
clear-majority" yet have relied on the Pico plurality as providing useful guidance in determining the
constitutional limits of removing books from a public school library. See Campbell v. St. Tammany
Parish School Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 189 (5th Cir. 1995); Case v. Unified School Dist. No. 233, 895 F.
Supp. 1463, 1469 (D. Kan. 1995).
128. Pico, 457 U.S. at 867 (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). The School
board removed nine books from a high school library, one from a junior high school library, and one
from the curriculum of a 12th grade literature class after having received a list of "objectionable" books
compiled by a statewide organization of politically conservative parents and disseminated at a statewide
conference. The board justified the book removal on the basis that they were "anti-American, anti-
Christian, anti-Semitic, and just plain filthy." Id. at 857.
129. Id. at 870-71. The plurality explained that if such impermissible motivation were a "decisive
factor," that is, a "'substantial factor' in the absence of which the opposite decision would have been
reached," then school officials would have acted unconstitutionally. Id.
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participation as citizens' and... for 'inculcating fundamental values necessary
to the maintenance of a democratic political system,'"'130 but at least in
curricular matters, school boards "might well defend their claim of absolute
discretion" to transmit community values."3 In other words, the state's broad
indoctrinative interest prevails in curricular cases, while a broad individual
right to receive information prevails in the library context. None of the other
six opinions generated in Pico accepted either this confused dichotomy or the
principle of an affirmative "right to receive information. "132 Nevertheless,
all seven Pico opinions stress in varying degrees the importance of values
inculcation, signaling a return to a more protectionist concept of state authority
that harkens back to the early twentieth century.133
Two cases decided in the mid-to-late 1980s brought the Court's values-
based ideology into sharper focus and more forcefully tipped the balance away
from student rights and in the direction of school governance and community
standards. In Bethel School District v. Fraser,IM the Court upheld the
authority of school officials to suspend a secondary school student for engaging
in lewd or indecent speech. In a direct retreat from Tinker, the Court affirmed
that students' constitutional rights at least in the public school setting are not
as broadly defined as those of adults in other settings.135 School officials may
limit not only certain forms of speech that they deem "threatening to
others, " 136 as in Tinker, but also speech that is "inappropriate" and contrary
to our "shared values." 137 The Court noted the objectives of public education
to be the "inculca[tion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of
a democratic political system." 3 1 While the Court recognized that these
fundamental values include tolerance of diverse political and religious views,
even unpopular ones, such views must be balanced against the interests of
130. Id. at 864 (quoting Ambach v. Norwick, 442 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
131. Id. at 869.
132. In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun rejected the plurality's suggestion that the
First Amendment imposes on the State an "affirmative obligation" to provide students with information
or ideas. He defined the right more narrowly, maintaining that the State cannot single out an idea and
deny access to it based on partisan or political motivation. Id. at 878-79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
133. Rosemary C. Salomone, Children Versus the State: The Status of Students' Constitutional
Rights, in CARING FOR AmERICA'S CmLDREN 182 (Frank I. Macchiarola & Alan Gartner eds., 1989).
134. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). In Fraser, a 17-year-old senior delivered a speech nominating a fellow
student for elective office. The speech, given before a voluntary assembly of students ranging in age
from 14 years and up, began with the words, "I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants..."
Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). The speech continued with additional sexual innuendo. The day
after the speech, Fraser was suspended for three days for having violated the school's disruptive conduct
rule and was removed from a list of candidates for graduation speakers. He was permitted to return to
school after the second day of suspension and was eventually permitted to speak at the graduation. Id.
at 690 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340-42 (1985)).
136. Id. at 683.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 681 (quoting Anmbach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. at 76-77).
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society in teaching the bounds of "socially appropriate behavior."1 39 In other
words, the Court reaffirmed the position implicit in Pico that public school
officials play a key role as arbiters and protectors of community values or
preferences. In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan made clear that there was
no suggestion here that school officials were motivated to regulate the student's
speech because they disagreed with the views expressed."4 This concept of
"viewpoint discrimination" later takes center stage in the Court's jurisprudence
of the 1990s, particularly in defining the limits of state authority to restrict
religious speech.
141
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,4 the Court
again set aside the expressive rights of students, this time in the context of a
school-sponsored newspaper, thus reaffirming the function of schooling as
values inculcation. However, the Court recognized broad societal values to
support the concept of local control as an end in itself rather than as a means
to promote community interests, as found in the cases of the 1970s. Here the
Court upheld the authority of school officials to control the "style and content"
of "school-sponsored" speech based upon "legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns." 143 According to the Hazelwood majority, schools are the primary
vehicle for transmitting "cultural values."'" As such, they may "refuse to
sponsor student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or
alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with 'the
shared values of a civilized social order.'" 45
Hazelwood clearly stands as the Court's most definitive statement on public
schooling as the primary vehicle for transmitting our "shared values."
Underlying this view are two assumptions: first, that there in fact exists an
ascertainable body of common values shared throughout society and in a
particular community, and second, that the school curriculum should be
standardized according to both those broader societal values and the more
particular values of the community as defined by local school officials. In
recent years, these assumptions have come under critical attack from dissenters
across the political spectrum, but most forcefully and visibly from religious
fundamentalists.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring).
141. See infra notes 203-219 and accompanying text.
142. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). Former high school students who had been members of the school's
newspaper which was also part of a journalism program alleged that their free speech rights had been
violated when the principal deleted two objectionable articles from an issue. One article addressed
student experiences with pregnancy while the other discussed the impact of parental divorce on several
students who attended the school.
143. Id. at 273.
144. Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
145. Id. (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683).
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III. THE VOICES OF DISSENT
Despite this decided shift in the Court's ideology over the past two decades,
litigation challenging both curricular and non-curricular decisions of school
officials has escalated, rendering the federal courts mediators in the national
culture war over values in the schools. Parents increasingly draw upon the
arsenal of rights developed in the Court's earlier decisions-from Meyer"4
to Yoder' 7-pressuring schools to reflect, or at a minimum to accommodate,
their particular moral values within the public school setting. This barrage of
litigation has proceeded primarily under the direction of organized groups,1 48
testing various legal theories to support the underlying proposition that parents
and not the schools have precedence in controlling the upbringing of their
children. These theories are grounded in the First Amendment Establishment
and Free Exercise Clauses, in Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process,
and most recently in the Free Speech Clause itself, dividing the litigation into
four categories for purposes of discussion and analysis.
Religious dissenters specifically have relied on a line of legal argument
asserting the right to be free from government speech that offends their
religious beliefs. This argument represents two litigation strategies. The first,
based on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and the concept of
"secular humanism," challenges the use of certain books or materials for all
students. The second, based on the Free Exercise Clause and the "opting-out"
principle, seeks individual exemptions from certain aspects of the curriculum
to avoid exposure to religiously offensive ideas.
A third strategy which has gained momentum in recent years focuses on
secular beliefs. Here dissenters assert a parental right to control the education
of one's children founded in Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process.
Raised alone, or in conjunction with a Free Exercise claim, these arguments
have met marginal success in the courts. However, religious minorities have
also begun to utilize a fourth litigation strategy, which has earned increasing
credence in the lower courts and recently in the Supreme Court. This strategy,
which may hold the greatest potential for changing the role of religion in
education, is based on the concept of "religion as viewpoint." Here individuals
assert the right to engage in religious speech, that is, to express religious views
146. 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (upholding in dicta right of parents to direct upbringing of their children
as liberty interest protected under Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process).
147. 406 U.S. 205 (1973) (upholding right of Amish to exemption from compulsory education laws
beyond eighth grade as protected under First Amendment Free Exercise Clause).
148. Groups representing plaintiffs in these cases include the Center for Law and Religious
Freedom, the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, the Christian Legal Society, Concerned
Women for America, the American Family Association Law Center, and Pat Robertson's American
Center for Law and Justice which has taken a lead role in a number of recent high-profile cases. People
for the American Way has taken a lead role in representing defendant school districts.
Yale Law & Policy Review
based not on the religion clauses but on the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.
The following discussion examines and contrasts recent litigation pursuing
these four strategies. The court decisions, with few exceptions, expressly or
implicitly reflect an ideology of schooling centered on the authority of school
officials to inculcate the shared values of the communities they represent and
of the society at large. These cases crystallize the competing legal and policy
interests at stake and provide an excellent framework for reconsidering the
concept of the common school as originally conceived.
A. The Right to Be Free from Government Speech
1. Secular Humanism and the Establishment Clause
The public schools have come under increasing attack in recent years as
promoting a secularist ideology, linked to such evils as premarital sex, drug
abuse, rock music, materialism, violence, alienation, pornography, and
communism,149 as well as "the present anti-intellectual ... climate" of
schooling which has led to grade inflation and declining S.A.T. scores. 5 ' In
the legal arena, this argument has been transformed into the claim that public
schools are teaching a religion of "secular humanism" in violation of the First
Amendment Establishment Clause.'5 ' This argument has received scant
recognition in the courts due to the ambiguity surrounding the concept. Legal
scholars have struggled to define religion in general 52 and have disagreed as
to whether secular humanism is in fact a religion,153 while the Supreme Court
149. See, e.g., TIM LAHAYE, THE BATrL= FOR THE MIND 135-40 (1980).
150. TIM LAHAYE, THE BATrLE FOR THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 258 (1983).
151. Id. at 71 ("Secular humanism, the official doctrine of public education, has all the markings
of a religion ... [and] monopolizes the minds of our nation's 43 million public-school children.").
152. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L.
REv. 579, 597-601 (limiting definition of religion to views with "extratemporal consequences"); Kent
Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV., 753, 762-76 (1984)
(identifying certain features of religion as customary yet rejecting view that any particular single feature
is necessary if enough other features are present); Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Non-
Establishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1386 (1967) ("Mhe Court must
adopt some elementary natural theology when presented with a claim that does not rest on an articulated
body of doctrine fitting into traditional categories of what is religious."); Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1072-75 (1978) (suggesting that in defining religion,
courts "must proceed at a level of inquiry that does not discriminate among creeds on the basis of
content, [and must] not circumscribe the very choices which the Constitution renders inviolate").
153. See Mitchell, supra note 82, at 662-63 (arguing that secularism "should be considered a
religion for establishment purposes because it is a belief system that offers truly competitive answers
to the same ultimate questions that are addressed by traditional religions"). But see Dent, supra note 72,
at 878 (arguing that public schools do not "advance a religion of Secular Humanism" because "they
teach no specific creed identifiable as such.., no detailed dogma or rituals ... no specific 'faith, to
which all else is subordinate'").
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has rarely addressed the definitional issue at all." Much of the argument in
support of secular humanism is grounded in a 1933 publication of the American
Humanist Association entitled A Humanist Manifesto,55 signed by 34
individuals including John Dewey, and an oft-quoted but judicially ignored
footnote from Torcaso v. Watkins, 56 where the Court stated that, "among
religions in this country which do not teach what would generally be
considered a belief in the existence of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical
Culture, Secular Humanism and others." 
1 57
Numerous cases grounded in secular humanism have been brought before
the courts without any success. 158 None of these, save one, has attracted
much attention outside the particular community in which the controversy
arose. The case of Smith v. Board of School Commissioners,159 however,
struck a sensitive nerve within the public education establishment and among
various public interest groups. By the mid-1980s, the religious attack on public
schools had reached a feverish pitch' 6° with strong support from the White
154. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (maintaining that religion is
"sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled
by the God of those" who are admittedly religious). But see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 635
n.6 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that Court referred to secular humanism as a religion
in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.ll (1961))
155. A Humanist Manifesto, NEW HUMANIST May-June 1933, reprinted in AMERICAN HUMANIST
ASSOCIATION, 1973 (defining "religious humanism" as alternative to traditional theism, based in modem
man's "understanding of the universe, his scientific achievements, and his deeper appreciation of
brotherhood."); see also Humanist Manifesto H, 33 THE HUMANiST Sept.-Oct. 1973, reprinted in
AMERICAN HUMANISr ASSOCIATION, 1973. For a discussion of organized secular humanism and
secularist ideology, see Mitchell, supra note 82, at 622-27.
156. 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (holding unconstitutional Maryland's requirement that state officers
declare belief in existence of God).
157. Id. at 495 n. 11. Subsequently the Court in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (prohibiting official prayer and Bible reading in public schools), noted that public schools "may
not establish a 'religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to
religion." Id. at 225.
158. See, e.g., Grove v. Mead School Dist., 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985) (rejecting argument
that book used in high school English classes promoted religion of secular humanism); Smith v. Ricci,
446 A.2d 501 ( N.J. 1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 962 (1982) (rejecting argument that public
school program in family life education established secularism); Citizens for Parental Rights v. San
Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S.
908, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 1000 (1975) (rejecting argument that public school's family life and sex
education program established religion hostile to parents' theistic religion); Wright v. Houston Indep.
School Dist., 366 F. Supp. 1208 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aft'd, 486 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 969 (1974) (rejecting argument that public schools' teaching evolution established secularism).
159. 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
160. In 1986-87, People for the American Way documented 103 censorship attempts of school
materials. This was a 20 percent increase over the previous year and a 168 percent increase since the
group's first report in 1981-82. The success rate for removing, restricting or modifying educational
materials had also increased during this period from 26 percent to 37 percent. In addition, the number
of challenges supported by organized groups had increased from 22 incidents to 54, with groups such
as Citizens for Excellence in Education gaining visibility and voice in local communities across the
country, organizing local chapters and running candidates in school board elections. PEOPLE FOR THE
AMERICAN WAY, ATTACKS ON THE FREEDOM TO LEARN 1986-87, at 3.
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House and growing support within Congress. 61 The Supreme Court was
moving toward a more accommodationist perspective on religion, leaving
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in a state of flux among Court members.
Perhaps most significantly, Smith raised the dangerous issue of censorship in
the minds of many educators, policy makers, and civil rights advocates. 62
In Smith, the federal appeals court reversed a district court decision which
had removed 44 books from schools on charges of promoting a religion of
secular humanism. The district court had found that the challenged home
economics, history, and social studies textbooks advanced secular humanism
and inhibited theistic religion. The appeals court, assuming arguendo that
secular humanism constitutes a religion, applied the standard established in
Lemon v. Kutman63 as refined by Justice O'Connor. The three-part Lemon
test for determining whether the Establishment Clause had been violated
requires that: (1) the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and (3) the statute must not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion."6 Given that the parties agreed that there was no question of a
religious purpose or of excessive entanglement, the appeals court focused on
the effect prong of Lemon. The court concluded that the materials did not have
the effect of conveying a message of endorsement of secular humanism or any
religion, but rather represented an attempt by school officials to "instill ...
such values as independent thought, tolerance of diverse views, self-respect,
maturity, self-reliance and logical decision-making." ' The court further
concluded that the books' omission of certain historical facts for non-religious
161. See Rosemary C. Salomone, From Widmar to Mergens: The Winding Road of First
Amendment Analysis, 18 HASINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 299-301 (1991) (discussing Reagan Admini-
stration's support for constitutional amendment to permit organized prayer in public schools and efforts
within Congress to remove school prayer cases from federal courts' subject matter jurisdiction).
162. A total of 26 groups filed amicus curiae briefs in the circuit court of appeals urging reversal
of the district court decision that upheld the parents' challenges. Included among the groups were the
National Education Association, the American Library Association, the American Jewish Congress, the
National Association of Laity (Catholic), the Association of American Publishers, the National School
Boards Association, the American Federation of Teachers, the American Humanist Association, and the
Fellowship of Religious Humanists.
163. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
164. Id. at 612-13. In a series of opinions dating from the mid-1980s, Justice O'Connor has refined
the three-part test originally articulated in Lemon into a two-part inquiry: "whether government's
purpose is to endorse religion and whether the statute [or action] actually conveys a message of
endorsement." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring). The test is
'whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the
[challenged action] would perceive it as a state endorsement of [religion]." Id. at 76. Justice Kennedy
has articulated a narrower inquiry based on two principles. The first principle precludes the government
from giving "direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact 'establishes a [state] religion or,
religious faith or tends to do so.'" Mergens v. Westside Community Bd. of Educ., 496 U.S. 226, 260
(1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). The second principle is that "government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.'" Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 583 (1992).
165. 827 F.2d at 692.
200
Vol. 14:169, 1996
Common Schools, Uncommon Values
reasons did not convey "a message of governmental disapproval of theistic
religions.'
Implicit in the appeals court decision are points that bear significantly on
the question of values inculcation in the schools. The court implies that
independent thought, i.e., critical thinking, is a permissible mode of analysis,
and tolerance is a permissible value to be inculcated through the school
curriculum, even when these offend the religious beliefs of some students and
parents in the school. The court seems to suggest further that religious views
need not be afforded equal time in the curriculum.
Federal courts have cited Smith in a more recent line of cases raising
similar issues. The courts have rejected challenges brought by fundamentalist
Christian parents to a widely used elementary reading series, Impressions.'6
The courts have held that the challenged selections, asking children to discuss
witches or to pretend they are witches in a role-play situation, have neither the
purpose nor the effect of endorsing an amorphous religion called "Wicca."11
Similar to Smith, these cases involved situations in which parents sought to
remove materials from the curriculum and impose their religious views on the
entire school community. Such controversies place school officials in a double-
bind, faced with the threat of litigation whichever way they turn. Particularly
where curricula materials meet valid pedagogical objectives, and school
officials offer no legitimate pedagogical reason for their removal, schools run
the risk of collateral constitutional attacks from the larger school population.
A school's acceding to the demands of religious dissenters could be interpreted
as an advancement or endorsement of a particular religious view that eliminates
opposing views.169 Such an accession could also be viewed as an attempt to
deny students access to ideas based on a non-pedagogical, or impermissible,
motivation in violation of free speech rights even under Hazelwood's loosely
defined standard of "legitimate pedagogical concerns." 70 In the absence of
166. Id. at 694.
167. The series contains more than 800 literary selections organized in 50 books, including works
of critically renowned authors such as Rudyard Kipling, Dr. Seuss, and C.S. Lewis. Brief of Amicus
Curiae, National Ass'n of the Laity et al. at 2, Brown v. Woodland Joint Unified School Dist. 200, 27
F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the books within the
educational establishment, see Debra Viadero, Panels in Ga., N.C. Reject Controversial Textbooks,
EDUC. WK., Oct. 10, 1990, at 13.
168. Fleischfresser v. Directors of School 200, 15 F.3d 680, 688 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Brown
v. Woodland Joint Unified School Dist. 200, 27 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1994). Conservative religious
groups further argue that the series is filled with "fear, violence, and negativism.. . [promoting] a real
hopelessness and depression." Glenn Ruffenach, Critics Try to Cast Bad Spell on Harcourt, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 16, 1990, at B1.
169. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (invalidating state statute which made it
unlawful for teachers in state schools to teach theory of human evolution on grounds of religious
purpose; for state to tailor its curriculum to satisfy principles or prohibitions of any religion would
violate the Establishment Clause).
170. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273; cf. Virgil v. School Board, 862 F.2d 1517 (11th Cir. 1989)
(upholding school board's removal of humanities textbook that included English translation of
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any secular educational reason for modifying the curriculum, there is no basis
for the court to defer to local decision makers.
2. Mere Exposure, Opting Out, and the Free Exercise of Religion
As Smith and its progeny demonstrate, religious parents have been
unsuccessful in their attempts to obtain broad relief under the Establishment
Clause through values-based curricular challenges. Nevertheless, others have
pursued an alternate course seeking a narrower remedy under the Free Exercise
Clause. Here claimants have relied on the principles articulated in Yoder,
seeking individualized accommodation through exemptions or partial opting-out
of a particular aspect of the curriculum.
During the 1970s and 1980s, claimants used the Free Exercise Clause to
challenge sex education or family life education programs.' Since most of
the state statutes mandating such programs already provided an opt-out
provision, courts generally refused the broad remedies sought."if These cases
have received minimal attention outside the local press. However, Mozert v.
Hawkins County Board of Education,73 a case decided by the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals just two days prior to the Smith decision, has shaped the legal
and political framework for subsequent discussion and debate on religious
accommodation in the public schools.
The Mozert litigation was initiated by fourteen Christian fundamentalists
and seventeen children who maintained that the basic reading series mandated
Aristophane's Lysistrata and Chaucer's The Miller's Tale based on "sexuality and vulgarity" contained
in works as reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concern under Hazelwood).
171. See Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal. Rptr. 1 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1975), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 908 (1976) (holding that sex education and family living
courses did not impair free exercise of religion nor represent an establishment of religion as statute
provided for parental right to remove children from instruction); Smith v. Ricci, 446 A. 2d 501 (N.J.
1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 962 (1982) (upholding state regulation requiring school districts to
develop and implement family life education program in public schools as not violative of Free Exercise
or Establishment clauses). But see Moody v. Cronin, 484 F. Supp. 270 (C.D.il. 1979) (holding that
state burdened free exercise of religion by requiring students to participate in coeducational physical
education classes for which "immodest apparel" was worn).
172. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 51240 (West 1996) which provides that:
Whenever any part of the instruction in health, family life education, and sex education conflicts
with the religious training and beliefs of the parent or guardian of any pupil, the pupil, on
written request of the parent or guardian, shall be excused from the part of the training which
conflicts with such religious training and beliefs.
See also N.J. ANN. STAT. § 18A: 35-4.7 (West 1989) which provides that:
Any child whose parent or guardian presents to the school principal a signed statement that any
part of the instruction in health, family life education or sex education is in conflict with his
conscience, or sincerely held moral or religious beliefs shall be excused from that portion of the
course where such instruction is being given and no penalties as to credit or graduation shall
result therefrom.
173. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988). In addition to this final
decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, four other published opinions comprise the body of the
Mozertlitigation, all bearing the name Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schs.: 579 F. Supp. 1051 (E.D.
Tenn. 1984); 582 F.2d 201 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); 765 F.2d 75 (6th Cir. 1985); 647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986).
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by the Hawkins County School Board violated their religious beliefs. 4
Children who refused to participate in the program would be suspended. The
objectionable materials fell into seventeen categories including "secular
humanism," "pacificism," "futuristic supernaturalism," "magic and false views
of death.""'5 The district court held that the plaintiffs' religious beliefs
mandated that they refrain from exposure to the Holt reading series, and,
therefore, forced participation placed a burden on their free exercise rights.
According to the district court, the school board had effectively placed students
in the position of either reading the offensive books or relinquishing their right
to free public schooling. 76 Absent court intervention, the plaintiffs would
have been forced to forfeit a public benefit available to all, i.e., public
education, in order to exercise their constitutionally protected right to freedom
of conscience and belief.
The appeals court reversed in three separate opinions, demonstrating the
complexity of the legal and policy issues raised in the case. 1" Chief Judge
Lively, writing for the court, held that mere exposure to these materials
without any attempt by the school to indoctrinate the children with any
particular value or religion did not place a burden on the free exercise of their
religious beliefs.178 Free exercise is not violated in the absence of compul-
sion; that is, there is no violation unless one is "required to affrm or deny a
belief or engage or refrain from engaging in a practice prohibited or required
by [one's] religion." 79 Judge Lively distinguished the case from Yoder where
it was impossible to reconcile the goals of public education with the religious
requirements of Amish agrarian society. In Mozert, the parents wanted their
children to have the benefit of an education that would prepare them for life
in the modem world but requested that they be exempt from exposure to some
ideas that they found religiously offensive. While the Amish had no choice but
to abandon their beliefs or violate the law, the plaintiffs in Mozert had the
174. Prior to the litigation, several school principals had agreed to accommodate the plaintiffs'
religious beliefs with alternative materials. The school board subsequently voted unanimously to
eliminate alternative reading programs and require all students in the district's schools to use the Holt,
Rinehart and Winston series. The litigation stemmed from this mandate.
175. 827 F.2d at 1062. More specifically, as summarized by the trial court, the plaintiffs
maintained that the books violated their religious beliefs because they:
1) depict witchcraft and other forms of magic and occult activities; 2) teach that some values
are relative and vary from situation to situation; 3) teach attitudes, values, and concepts of
disrespect and disobedience to parents; 4) depict prayer to an idol; 5) teach that one does not
need to believe in God in a specific way but that any type of faith in the supernatural is an
acceptable method of salvation; 6) depict a child who is disrespectful of his mother's Bible
study; 7) imply that Jesus was illiterate; 8) teach that man and apes evolved from a common
ancestor; 9) teach various humanistic values.
Mozert I, 579 F. Supp. at 1051-52.
176. Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 647 F. Supp. at 1200.
177. 827 F.2d at 1062.
178. Id. at 1063.
179. Id. at 1070.
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option to send their children to private schools or to engage in home
schooling."to The opinion went on to recognize the role that public schools
play in inculcating values, including those values that are fundamental to
democratic government, such as the tolerance of diverse political and religious
views.18'
Judge Kennedy, in a separate opinion, provided the most forceful argument
in support of cultural uniformity; while she agreed with Judge Lively's analysis
and concurred in his opinion, she maintained that even if the court of appeals
were to find a burden on the plaintiffs' exercise of their religious beliefs in this
or a similar case, the school district had three compelling interests that justified
its imposition of curricular uniformity: (1) an interest in avoiding classroom
disruption (the opt-out remedy would fragment the curriculum); (2) an interest
in avoiding "religious divisiveness"; and (3) an interest in developing in
students the skills necessary for citizenship and self-government through the
improvement of critical thinking skills. For Judge Kennedy, education in a
democracy must provide students with the opportunity to develop independently
their own ideas and to form their own judgments on "complex and controver-
sial social and moral issues. " 182
Judge Boggs, on the other hand, focused on the governance question,
viewing this case as not about religious beliefs but as about the Establishment
Clause "limits on school boards to prescribe a curriculum. " " While Judge
Boggs did not preclude school officials from accommodating religious beliefs
as a matter of administrative decision making, he did not require accommoda-
tion by law. In other words, while the Supreme Court has not authorized
federal courts to require that school officials justify their decisions each time
they fail to address students' religiously compelled objections, nothing in the
Constitution precludes local authorities from voluntarily providing such
accommodation. '"
Taken together, the three opinions raise several complex issues: (1) whether
180. Id. at 1067. A subsequent case decided by the New York Court of Appeals, Ware v. Valley
Stream High School, 550 N.E.2d 320 (N.Y. 1989), more clearly defines the limits of Yoder. Here the
plaintiffs, members of the Plymouth Brethren, challenged state regulations requiring that all primary and
secondary students in the state receive instruction on the AIDS virus as violating their free exercise
rights. They maintained that Yoder created an exception to the rule that mere exposure to religiously
offensive ideas is not protected by the Constitution. Upon summary judgment, the case was appealed
and the Court of Appeals remanded it to the trial court for further fact-finding, particularly on the
question as to whether the compulsory AIDS curriculum burdened the exercise of their religious beliefs.
The court noted that plaintiffs, unlike the Amish, were so thoroughly integrated into the larger society
that the state requirement imposed at most only a limited burden. Id. at 121-22.
181. 827 F.2d at 1068 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681). Judge Lively noted that the tolerance
"referred to by the Supreme Court is a civil tolerance, not a religious one. It does not require a person
to accept any other religion as the equal of the one to which that person adheres. It merely requires a
recognition that in a pluralistic society, we must 'live and let live.'" Id. at 1069.
182. Id. at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 1080 (Boggs, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 1079-80.
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neutral exposure constitutes indoctrination; (2) if so, whether such indoctrina-
tion necessarily burdens the exercise of one's religious beliefs, thereby rising
to the level of a free exercise violation; and (3) if such a burden is found,
whether there exist sufficiently compelling pedagogical justifications to override
free exercise interests. Put conversely, the third issue is whether the opt-out
remedy is sufficiently narrow as to override the dangers of educational
fragmentation, religious divisiveness, and political instability. These immediate
questions beg for resolution.
Many of the tensions beneath contemporary schooling in America seem to
erupt in the claims and arguments advanced on both sides in Mozert. The case
strikes at the heart of values inculcation, the political purposes of the common
school, parental discretion, and the tension between cultural pluralism and
assimilation. Nevertheless, Mozert may not have presented the ideal fact pattern
for a winning test case. It appears that the school board may have been
motivated by a certain bias against the group, while the plaintiffs may have had
a broader agenda than their claims would indicate at first blush. 185
None of the Mozert opinions offers definitive or wholly satisfactory answers
to the opting-out debate. However, their different rationales have triggered an
explosion of legal commentary which has dissected the issues for future courts
to address.'86 While the case has no precedential value beyond the Sixth
185. For a detailed discussion of the Mozert litigation, see STEPHEN BATES, BATrLEGROUND: ONE
MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS
303-07 (1993) (questioning motives on both sides of case and suggesting that interest groups
representing defendant school board may have been driven partially by hostility or at least suspicion of
Christian fundamentalists and might have accepted district court's opt-out decision had plaintiffs been
of another religion, while plaintiffs and their lawyers may have been pursuing a broader transformation
in public schooling and schooling in general than merely "alternative readers for a handful of children")
Id. at 306.
186. See, e.g., Nomi Maya Stolzenburg, "He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out:" Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993) (arguing that
neither liberal individualism, communitarianism, nor civic republicanism adequately addresses question
of whether teaching of toleration and rationality in public schools constitutes harmful indoctrination);
William Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66
IND. L. REV. 351, 373 (1991) (arguing that underlying Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses is
concern for tolerance and that therefore "a 'right' to be free from offense is fundamentally antithetical
to the First Amendment"); Shelley Burtt, Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defense ofan
Illiberal Education, 56 REv. POLmCS 51, 65-66 (Winter 1994) (arguing that even if the Constitution
grants school boards authority to insist on curriculum uniformity in face of parental religious objections,
as matter of public policy, opting-out does not necessarily compromise democratic citizenship or liberal
autonomy; merely because one rejects secular reasoning, this alone does not necessarily deny one
capability to engage in rational deliberation about the good life); Amy Gutmann, Undemocratic
Education, in LiBERAuSM AND THE MORAL LIFE 84-85 (Nancy Rosenblum, ed., 1989) (arguing that
plaintiff parents in Mozert demanded education that is inconsistent with development of rational inquiry
skills and mutual understanding as required in religiously diverse society). One commentator has argued
that exposing children in a school setting to religiously offensive doctrine constitutes a Free Exercise
violation for several reasons: education is compulsory; the audience is a captive and impressionable one;
the intensive atmosphere makes the coercive nature more severe; the alternative of foregoing education
altogether places an economic burden on those students whose religious beliefs prohibit them from
participating in certain school programs; and furthermore, for the courts to determine whether mere
exposure is indoctrination would permit the courts to project the judges' own values on to schools. Dent,
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Circuit, lower courts continue to draw on the rationale of Judge Lively's
opinion holding that mere exposure does not rise to the level of a cognizable
free exercise claim. Unless and until courts are persuaded otherwise or adopt
an alternative rationale for recognizing a free exercise violation, parents who
seek exemption for their children from any curricular requirement, whether
based on religious or secular beliefs, must revert to the fragile concept of
parental rights under Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process.
B. Parental Autonomy and Substantive Due Process
This brings us to a third strategy used particularly by parents who challenge
certain aspects of the school program based on secular beliefs. Here parents
assert the right to control the education and upbringing of their children under
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process as developed by the Court in
Meyers' and Pierce.' In some cases they also draw on Yoder?89 as philo-
sophical support for the concept of parental autonomy even where the claim is
not religion-based.
While there has developed over the past several decades a substantial body
of litigation based on religious challenges to the curriculum, it is only in recent
years that parents have increasingly begun to mount secular challenges." 9
This change undoubtedly reflects both the heightened controversy over values
in the schools and the complexity of social issues that schools now address.
Two issues that have come before the courts in recent years underscore the
constitutional limitations of a secular challenge. The first concerns school
programs related to AIDS prevention, including condom distribution; the
second concerns community service requirements for graduation.191
supra note 72, at 891-93 (1988).
187. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
188. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
189. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In a concurring opinion in Yoder, Justice White noted the limited scope
of Pierce, pointing out that it lent "no support to the contention that parents may replace state
educational requirements with their own idiosyncratic views of what knowledge a child needs to be a
productive and happy member of society." Id. at 239 (White, J., concurring).
190. One other period in recent decades witnessed a temporary increase in secular challenges to
school requirements based on student, and not parental, rights. During the early 1970s, at the height of
the students' rights movement, courts consistently found that hair and dress codes did not infringe on
First Amendment free speech rights in the absence of any showing that the student's appearance was
intended as the symbolic expression of ideas. See, e.g., Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir.
1971); Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); New Rider v. Bd.
of Educ., 480 F.2d 693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973).
191. In a third set of cases concerning "home schooling," parents have sought to completely opt-out
of institutional schooling and educate their children at home, challenging certain state regulations such
as teacher certification requirements that often preclude them from doing so. Courts have consistently
held that absent a claim based on religious beliefs, parents have no fundamental right to educate their
children free from reasonable governmental regulation. See People v. Bennett, 501 N.W.2d 106, 115
(Mich. 1993).
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In Alfonso v. Fernandez,19 parents challenged a component of an
HIV/AIDS education program which called for high schools to make condoms
available to students upon request without prior parental consent or the
opportunity for parental opting-out. The state appellate court, citing Meyer,
Pierce, and Yoder, held that the program violated the parents' liberty interest
in rearing and educating their children according to their own views. The court
specifically declared that parents have the right to regulate the sexual activity
of their children without state interference absent a showing that the policy is
essential to serving a compelling state interest."r While the state has a
compelling interest in preventing the spread of AIDS, there exist alternative
sources from which minors can obtain condoms. Distinguishing the facts from
Mozert, the court noted that the program did not merely expose students to
"talk or literature on sexual behavior... [but] offered the means to engage in
sexual activity ... interfering with parental decisionmaking in a particularly
sensitive area." 1' 4 On its face, Alfonso firmly supports the parental right to
raise secular objections to the public school curriculum. However, subsequent
state and federal court decisions have qualified its holding and, in some cases,
rejected its rationale entirely.
In a case involving identical facts and legal claims, Curtis v. School
Committee of Falmouth,1" the Massachusetts court, also citing Meyer,
Pierce, and Yoder, recognized a fundamental liberty interest to rear one's
children free of governmental intrusion but only where there is present the
element of coercion or compulsion. Here, the parents had failed to demonstrate
that the condom distribution program had a coercive effect on their parental
liberties. According to the court, participation in the program was voluntary;
there was no penalty or disciplinary action attached to a refusal to partici-
pate. 196
In Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc.," the First Circuit
rejected a claim by parents of high school students that their children's
compelled attendance at a sexually explicit AIDS awareness assembly violated
their privacy right to direct the upbringing of their children. Discussing the
history of parental rights, the court noted that the Supreme Court has yet to
192. 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (A.D. 2 Dept. 1993), appeal dismissed without op., 637 N.E.2d 279
(1994).
193. Id. at 265.
194. Id. at 266. However, the court also held that the program did not violate the Free Exercise
Clause merely because the parents found the program "objectionable" as parents do not have the right
to tailor public school programs to individual religious preferences. Id. at 268.
195. 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 753 (1996).
196. Id. at 585-86. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' free exercise claim on the basis of their
having failed to demonstrate a "substantial burden," i.e., one that is coercive or compulsory in nature.
Id. at 587.
197. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3591 (U.S. Mar. 4, 1996) (No. 95-
1158).
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decide whether the right to rear and educate one's child is among those
fundamental rights that merit heightened scrutiny. Not only were Meyer and
Pierce decided long before current developments in right to privacy jurispru-
dence, but the cases themselves used the language of "reasonable relation"
indicating that the Court was applying something less than a compelling interest
standard.198 Nevertheless, the appeals court concluded that even setting aside
this question, the liberty interest upheld in Meyer and Pierce for parents to
choose their children's education free of governmental interference does not
include the right to "dictate the curriculum" and thereby "restrict the flow of
information" at the public school to which they have chosen to send them.'"
The court here noted that even the Alfonso decision had drawn a distinction
between action (to engage in sexual activity) in contravention of parental values
and mere exposure (through a sexually explicit program).
The Second Circuit was apparently unwilling to draw that distinction in
Immediato v. Rye Neck School Dist.' Here parents challenged the school
district's requirement of forty hours of mandatory community service as a
condition to high school graduation. While the court recognized a parental
liberty interest in child rearing under the Fourteenth Amendment, it unequivo-
cally interpreted Meyer and Pierce as requiring nothing more than rational basis
review.2"1 Citing Yoder, the court noted that while the Constitution distin-
guishes between religious and secular objections, affording higher protection
to the former, it does not distinguish among secular objections based on values
or morals, as was the case here, or other firmly held beliefs. Secular objections
to the school program of any nature do not rise to the level of a fundamental
constitutional right.' The court further refused to "ratchet up" the standard
of review merely because the program forced the students to "act" in
contravention of their parents' values as compared with simply exposing them
to information that conflicted with those values. According to the court, the
exposure/action distinction is "somewhat chimerical." 3
These cases underscore the confused state of substantive due process
jurisprudence. They also reveal a decided reluctance on the part of the federal
judiciary to recognize a fundamental parental right to challenge the public
school curriculum on purely secular grounds, even where the objections
198. Id. at 535, citing Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403 and Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. See Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), for a contemporary revival of substantive due process in the non-
economic sphere with more exacting judicial scrutiny than the "reasonableness" standard.
199. Id. at 533-34.
200. No. 189, 95-7237, 1996 WL 5547 (2nd Cir. Jan. 2, 1996).
201. Id. at *5.
202. Id. at *6.
203. Id. at *6; see also Hemdon v. Chapel Hill-Carboro City Bd. of Educ., 899 F. Supp. 1443,
1450 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (rejecting "parental rights" challenge to mandatory community service program
on grounds that the Constitution does not provide fundamental right of individual parents to "exert
preemptive control" over public school curriculum and upholding program under rational basis review).
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support widely-held moral beliefs. With the exception of the state appeals court
decision in Alfonso, these cases join those discussed in the previous sections in
a seamless web of judicial perspective on the question of values inculcation in
the schools. The clear trend in the state and federal courts is to avoid the
intrusiveness of parental attempts to shape the curriculum to their own
individualistic values in favor of school officials and their authority to make
curriculum determinations that reflect broader community and societal values.
C. The Right to Engage in Religious Speech as Viewpoint
In addition to asserting their children's right to be free from government
speech or indoctrination and their own right to control their children's
education, dissenting parents have also asserted their children's right to engage
in speech of a religious nature. Religious speech in the public schools can take
several forms, from school-organized or student-led prayer, to religious group
meetings, to the distribution of religious literature, to the expression of
religious perspectives by individual students in the course of classroom
activities or as part of a class assignment. The litigation in this area has been
grounded in two principles: that religious speech is speech protected under the
Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and that religious speech demands
equal treatment as afforded other forms of speech. Courts must weigh these
claims against the limitations of the Establishment Clause.
For many years following the Supreme Court's controversial rulings on
school prayer and Bible reading in the 1960s,l school districts and many
lower courts interpreted these decisions as prohibiting any form of religious
speech in the public schools. The religious revival of the 1980s, however,
pushed the school prayer issue to the fore of the public policy debate. The
1984 federal Equal Access Act,' a bipartisan congressional attempt to
provide legal protection for student-initiated religious speech while avoiding the
constitutional pitfalls of school-sponsored prayer,' opened the schoolhouse
door to religious expression within specific guidelines. More recently, the issue
of graduation prayers has attracted national attention and caused turmoil in
school districts across the country.'
As the religious speech debate has broadened beyond the school prayer
204. See supra note 3.
205. Equal Access Act of 1984, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-74 (1994). The Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial assistance
and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair opportunity to, or
discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting within that limited open
forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at
such meetings.
206. For a discussion of the politics surrounding passage of the act, see Salomone, supra note 161,
at 298-305.
207. The debate has escalated since the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577 (1992).
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issue per se, the concept of religious speech as viewpoint has taken center
stage. In this debate, "viewpoint" is synonymous with "perspective. " 208
Religious perspective, rather than being relegated to a distinct excludable
category, can represent a separate viewpoint on apparently secular subject
matter. Legal strategies to support this concept draw doctrinally from three
principles. The first is a principle of "viewpoint neutrality" under public forum
doctrine2° requiring that government restrictions on speech be fully "view-
point neutral" even where the property is not public. In other words, even in
the non-public forum, 210 government cannot prohibit speech based on its
religious perspective where speakers have been permitted to speak on the same
subject from a non-religious or secular perspective.
The second principle that bears on the jurisprudence of religious speech is
the distinction between government speech and private speech. According to
this principle, the Establishment Clause does not provide a sufficiently
compelling justification for restricting private religious expression merely
because it is religious. As the Court has stated, "there is a crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause
forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free
Exercise Clauses protect."2 ' A related third principle distinguishes between
208. Good New/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501, 1506, 1507 (8th Cir.
1994).
209. Public forum doctrine is a framework developed by the Supreme Court for analyzing the
permissibility of speech on public property as weighed against the government's interest in limiting the
use'of its property. The doctrine divides public property into three categories: the traditional public
forum or localities which by long tradition or by government flat have been devoted to assembly or
debate; the designated or limited public forum, created when government has by policy or practice
opened the property for use by certain speakers or for the discussion of certain topics (government is
not required to create or maintain access to this limited public forum; however, once it does it must
afford the same protection as in the traditional public forum but only as to the same character of speech
that was originally designated for protection by the government); and the non-public forum which
includes speakers and topics not designated by government for inclusion or access in the designated
public forum and which is not considered a traditional public forum. In the first two categories,
government cannot restrict speech based on its content absent a compeling justification. In the third
category, content restrictions on speech are permissible as long as they are "reasonable" when viewed
in light of the purpose served by the forum and are "viewpoint-neutral." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1984).
210. Since the Hazelwood decision, lower courts have struggled to determine if various aspects of
the public school constitute a designated public forum where government cannot restrict speech based
on its content without a compelling reason, or a non-public forum as the Court found with the school
newspaper in Hazelwood where restriction on speech need only be reasonable. See, e.g., Hemry v.
School Bd. of Colorado Springs Sch. Dist., 760 F. Supp. 856 (D. Colo. 1991) (school hallways were
neither public forum nor limited public forum because school had not designated them to be used
indiscriminately by public); Hedges v. Wauconda Community Unit School District 118, 9 F.3d 1295
(7th Cir. 1993) (junior high school was non-public forum). But see Clark v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
806 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1992); Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280 (E.D. Pa.
1991); Rivera v. East Otero Sch. Dist., 721 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Colo. 1989) (all rejecting applicability
of public forum doctrine to non school-sponsored religious speech).
211. Board of Educ. of the Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1989). For
a sympathetic discussion of religious speech in the schools, see Jay Alan Sekulow, James Henderson,
& John Tuskey, Proposed Guideflnes for Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools,
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official toleration and promotion of student speech. As the Court noted in
Hazelwood," unlike the symbolic speech upheld in inker,13 publication
of student articles required the school not merely to tolerate speech, but to
"lend its name and resources" to the dissemination of student speech. In cases
where the public might perceive school sponsorship, linker's standard of
material disruption is replaced by Hazelwood's mere reasonableness. 1 4
Two recent Supreme Court decisions clearly apply principles drawn from
this area of First Amendment free speech jurisprudence to develop the concept
of "religious viewpoint." In Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free
School District,215 the Court unanimously upheld the right of an outside
religious group to use public school facilities after school hours to show a film
series on the family. Officials had previously granted access to similar speakers
and subjects. According to the Court, there was no indication that "the
particular film involved here would have been denied for any reason other than
the fact that the presentation would have been from a religious perspec-
tive. "216
More recently in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of
Virginia,2 7 a clear descendent of Lamb's Chapel, a deeply divided Court
held that the denial of funds to a student-run newspaper with a Christian
editorial viewpoint by a state university amounted to viewpoint discrimination.
Government funding of religious activities was obviously a more sensitive and
politically consequential issue for the Court to address than that in Lamb's
Chapel. Nevertheless, in Rosenberger the Court majority approached the denial
of funding as "viewpoint discrimination," stating that "government must
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the
opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction."218
According to the majority, religion may provide "a specific premise, a
perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed
46 MERCER L. REV. 1017 (1995).
212. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
213. T7nker, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
214. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at273 (holding that school officials may exercise editorial control over
"style and content" of school-sponsored activities "so long as their actions are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns").
215. 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993).
216. Id. at 2147. The concept of religious speech as viewpoint or perspective from Lamb's Chapel
was drawn upon subsequently in Good News/Good Sports Club v. School Dist. of Ladue, 28 F.3d 1501,
1506 (8th Cir. 1994), where the appeals court held that denial of access to school district property
immediately after school hours on the same basis as a secular organization on a similar subject, i.e., the
moral development of young people, impermissibly discriminated on the basis of viewpoint in violation
of the First Amendment. The court noted that "'Viewpoint' is not limited to whether a speaker supports
or opposes a particular resolution of an issue; rather, viewpoint is synonymous with perspective." The
court further noted that the issue of the school district's motive, that is, whether the school district
opposed the viewpoint, was irrelevant. Id. at 1507, citing Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147-48.
217. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
218. Id. at 2516.
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and considered."219
This emerging approach differs dramatically from the ideology of past
decades which advocated that public education steer clear of any religious
content. Of all the legal strategies used by religious conservatives to exercise
their religious beliefs in the educational arena, the concept of religious speech
as viewpoint carries the most potential for expanding the role of religion in the
public schools. Not only has it received support from the Supreme Court, but
as the following discussion notes, it has come to serve as a cautious point of
consensus among groups traditionally thought to be at polar extremes on the
church-state question.
IV. A SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND
This Article began with a historical look at schooling in America followed
by a measured progression to the present, charting the constitutional issues
arising throughout. Viewing that evolution through the lens of court decisions,
we see the interconnection between law and policy. Viewing that evolution
through the eyes of the common school reformers, we understand the
importance of our shared traditions and the role that education plays in
conveying these traditions to succeeding generations.
We must recognize, however, that we can remain true to the idea of
regeneration without our history necessarily binding our destiny. American
society has not remained static since the days of the common school reformers.
Sociological and psychological developments in teaching and learning theory
have left us with an understanding of pedagogy unforeseen in the mid-1800s.
Concepts of individual rights and liberties, the rise of the administrative state
and government regulation of schooling, even mass compulsory state-controlled
education itself, were far from the consciousness of the common school
reformers, much less the constitutional framers of the previous century. High
literacy rates generated largely through mass schooling, together with the rapid
development of mass media and the technological explosion of recent decades,
have left parents far more knowledgeable and capable to advocate on behalf of
their children's educational interests. The transformations of the last four
decades have further altered the context in which educational processes should
be considered, from the civil rights and women's movements of the sixties and
seventies, to the religious revivalism and political mobilization of religious
groups of the eighties, to the racial backlash and religious conciliation of the
nineties.
The hard questions raised in the most visible litigation have attracted
significant scholarly attention in recent years and have generated serious
219. Id. at 2517.
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attempts at resolution. Nevertheless, the discussion seems to be caught in a
time warp, fixated on a system of education that was designed more than a
century ago to meet the political and economic goals of a young and uncertain
nation at the onset of a grand experiment. Those basic goals were cultural
assimilation and industrialization. Thus, the ghost of Horace Mann continues
to hover over us as we prepare to enter yet another century.
The escalating controversy over parental rights and educational values,
however, may be a sign that the time has come to unload this historical
baggage, to lay bare some of the myths surrounding both the necessity of
government controlled common schooling and the motives and aspirations of
dissenting parents, and to re-examine critically the purposes and structure of
education in America.
A. Breaking Down the Myths
Driving the values debate is the fundamental question of how to preserve
basic freedoms in a pluralist society governed by majority consent and founded
on democratic principles. The underlying policy issues seem to defy resolution,
raising legitimate but nonetheless conflicting individual (parental), local
(community), and national (societal) interests. Whether addressed in the judicial
or policy arena, attempts to work through these complexities inevitably lead to
a tangled web of thorny concepts such as curriculum fragmentation, religious
centrality, critical inquiry, rational deliberation, tolerance, and religious
viewpoint.
For example, in considering the constitutional rights of dissenting parents,
we must not lose sight of the constitutional rights of the wider school
community and principles of sound pedagogy. Parents may raise valid concerns
that the curriculum or materials used may contradict their world view, whether
based in religious beliefs or moral philosophy. Yet, if schools were to yield to
their demands by removing objectionable materials from the curriculum, this
would create a climate of censorship. Even more modest accommodations
could prove problematic. If schools were to permit parents the absolute right
to opt-out of certain classes or programs, they may run the risk of fragmenting
the curriculum and sacrificing the cohesiveness that a sound educational
program, integrated across subject areas, should strive to attain.' In this
regard, the particular aspect of the curriculum in which the accommodation is
made may prove significant. For instance, permitting dissenting parents to opt
their children out of a reading program that is central to the instructional
program in the elementary grades may undermine the school's overall
educational objectives to a greater degree than, perhaps, opting-out of
community service or physical education or even AIDS education, although the
220. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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state arguably has compelling public welfare reasons for mandating such
programs as AIDS education. In other words, the resolution of the parental
rights question is highly contextual.
If the right to opt-out, then, is not absolute, we must consider where
schools should draw the line on accommodation. What would happen to the
overall instructional program if a school were confronted with an onslaught of
opt-out requests, each demanding an idiosyncratic form of accommodation?
How many reading programs can one school reasonably implement at one
time? Requests for accommodation which become too particularized could
prove to be an administrative nightmare, unless standards are set to limit the
accommodation of such requests. One solution is to follow the narrow
standards set forth in Yoder22 under the Free Exercise Clause, which focuses
on a group's insularity from the larger society, the centrality of their objection
to their religious beliefs, and the impact of the exemption on the child's overall
education in citizenship and self-sufficiency.
The Yoder standards are sufficiently narrow to exclude claims such as those
advanced by the parents in Mozert.m However, the claims advanced by the
parents in VWrem against AIDS education may approximate the Yoder
standards closely enough to have survived at least a motion for summary
judgment.2 4 Furthermore, given the Court's emphasis on the group charac-
teristics of the Amish, the Yoder standards exclude individual spiritual claims
not founded in group-based beliefs. The centrality factor also places school
officials, and subsequently the courts, in the questionable position of making
discretionary value judgments concerning the relative importance of certain
beliefs to the continued exercise of the claimant's faith. Such an examination
of religious beliefs creates problems under the Establishment Clause.'
The Court in Yoder specifically limited its holding to challenges grounded
221. 406 U.S. 205 (1973).
222. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). According to Judge Lively, unlike the Amish in Yoder who
were unable to reconcile the goals of public education with the religious requirements of the Amish faith
and the needs of their separate agrarian society, the plaintiffs in Mozert did not have to abandon their
beliefs to comply with the law but could instead attend private schools or engage in home schooling.
Id. at 1067.
223. 550 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1989). The New York Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial
court for further fact finding as to whether the AIDS curriculum burdened the exercise of the plaintiffs'
religious beliefs given their apparent integration into the larger society.
224. See Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free Exercise of
Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933, 934 (1989) (noting disparity between protective constitutional
standard of Free Exercise Clause and failure of courts to apply it rigorously).
225. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. The continued vitality of the centrality factor is
questionable. In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the
Court rejected the idea that judges should consider "centrality," while the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act, P.L. 103-142 (1993), supra note 95, does not resurrect the concept. But see Battles
v. Anne Arundel County Bd of Educ., 904 F. Supp. 471, 477 (D. Md. 1995) (distinguishing facts from
Yoder in that parent challenging state home schooling requirements did not allege that separation from
modern society was central tenet of her religion).
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in religious as opposed to philosophical or other secular beliefs. The Supreme
Court and lower courts continue to reaffirm the religious/secular distinction
laid out in Yoder. 22 This distinction raises the same concerns as the centrality
factor, calling upon school officials and ultimately the courts to define what is
a bona fide religious objection and what is merely secular. Furthermore, a
compelling argument can be made that the accommodation of only religious
objections privileges religious beliefs over secular values in the hierarchy of
constitutional protections, thereby denying religious and secular beliefs "equal
constitutional dignity. "
The concepts of critical inquiry and rational deliberation also bear on this
discussion. In recent years, a wealth of scholarly commentary has emerged on
the importance of these two concepts as vital to the preservation of liberal
democracy and republicanism.' This leads to the question as to whether
accommodating religious views in the curriculum would necessarily compro-
mise liberal autonomy, democratic citizenship, or republican deliberation.
However, we cannot assume that all parents who seek accommodation are
inherently hostile to the concept of individual autonomy. In fact, it is exactly
such autonomy that these dissenting parents are asserting for themselves. Of
course it can be argued that these same parents are denying autonomy to their
children. It can further be argued that parents do not always represent the best
226. See supra notes 189-203 and accompanying text discussing recent claims brought under
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process.
227. See William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise
Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 357, 393-94 (1989-90) (arguing that religious belief "cannot and
should not be segregated from its political effect" and that favoring of religious ideas runs counter to
both Establishment Clause concerns as to religious domination of the political process and Free Speech
Clause concerns as to the need for equality in the marketplace of ideas); Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious
Conduct, 61 U. CHi. L. REv. 1245, 1248, 1283 (1994) (arguing that it is distinct vulnerability to
discrimination and not distinct value of religious practices that motivates constitutional solicitude and
that, therefore, religious beliefs should be afforded equal regard rather than greater privilege in
constitutional law).
228. See, e.g., AMY GUTMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 51 (1987) ("Children must learn to
behave not in accordance with authority but to think critically about authority if they are to live up to
the democratic ideal of sharing political sovereignty as citizens."); MASSARO, supra note 43, at 147
("[A] public school teacher who took it upon herself to resolve... constitutional ambiguities for her
students ... [or] who took [the parents'] side on all constitutional issues ... would thereby be
subordinating the strong First Amendment interest in dissent and critical inquiry... in favor of either
an amorphous and highly qualified parental right to control the upbringing of the child or of a vaguer
still community right to promote a particular viewpoint."); Susanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism:
Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. C. L. REv. 131, 172 (1995) ("[1]n a diverse republic, where
citizenship consists in rational deliberation and dialogue about the good life for individuals and the
nation as a whole.... cultural literacy is not enough .... Without the ability to think critically...
[riepublican deliberation will be impossible because there will be neither the capacity to deliberate nor
anything about which to deliberate."); see also Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d
1070-1071 (noting that "a principal educational objective is to teach the students how to think critically
about complex and controversial subjects and to develop their own ideas and make judgments about
these subjects .... Mandatory participation in reading classes using the Holt series or some similar
reading is essential to accomplish this compelling interest.") (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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interests of their children and that there are times when the state should usurp
parental rights. But such an argument suggests that the state, as represented in
the school context by elected and appointed officials ostensibly promoting the
majoritarian values or preferences of the community, can determine what is
best for the child. This presumption is highly debatable where the rights of
families holding minority views are involved, while it is much less controver-
sial in extreme cases of parental neglect or abuse.
Although it seems evident that critical thinking skills are key to democratic
government, we cannot assume that all religiously inclined parents who
challenge certain instructional programs or materials prefer their children to
think any less critically. Some may merely want their children, as most parents
do, to reach a conclusion regarding certain values or scientific phenomena that
is similar to their own. If by "critical thinking skills" we mean the ability to
examine information presented objectively by the teacher and to reach an
independent conclusion, must that conclusion be free of parental influence?
We cannot assume that parents and children who reject secular teaching are
incapable of rational thought simply because they ground their views of
worldly phenomena in transcendental norms rather than in what we conven-
tionally consider "objective" scientific inquiry. The assertion that their
religious orientation impairs their ability to participate effectively in the
democratic process or to engage in republican deliberation is purely specula-
tive. 9 Both democracy and republicanism depend for their sustenance on a
mix of diverse views that generate civil debate and dialogue. If the concern
here rests on evidence that religiously inclined individuals form their political
views based upon those of their religious leaders, this concern demonstrates a
suspicion of, and perhaps a hostility toward, religious views."o Citizens of
every stripe are influenced in their politics by group identification, whether it
be membership in a political party, a union, a professional organization, or any
interest group.
On a related point, we cannot assume that public schools teach children to
think critically in the sense of reaching independent conclusions. Schooling is
229. See Mark Fischer, The Sacred and the Secular: An Examination of the "Wall of Separation"
and Its Impact on the Religious World View, 54 U. PMTr. L. REV. 325, 342 (1992) (arguing that
democracy is not based on "scientifically proven ideas" but rather on understanding of social good as
arrived at by consensus of citizens provided that consensus falls within constitutional bounds). But see
Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the
Religion Clauses ofthe First Amendment, 52 U. Prrr. L. REV. 75, 79 (1990) (arguing that religion is
fundamentally incompatible with intellectual cornerstone of modem democratic state because religious
claims are based on absolute truths which are unprovable and therefore insulated from political
examination).
230. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 24 (1993) (arguing that contemporary
culture conveys message that "people who take their religion seriously, who rely on their understanding
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inherently indoctrinative. Both the formal and informal curriculum, established
by those in authority in accordance with their own views or those of the
majority in the community, are value-laden-from the textbooks selected, to the
methods of teaching, to extra-curricular offerings. School officials may believe
that students are developing critical thinking skills in order to form their own
conclusions. However, the curriculum may in fact lead students to certain
school/teacher-directed conclusions. While at least two judges in Mozert agreed
that "mere exposure" to certain instructional materials does not require students
to affirm or deny their beliefs,"' this position overlooks the indoctrinative
power that the values reflected throughout the school experience may have over
the formation or transformation of beliefs, particularly in young students. In
other words, while school officials may not "intend" to influence values in this
way, exposure can have the "effect" of affirmation or denial, leading students
to adopt values, such as those supporting abortion rights or the theory of
evolution, that directly contradict those espoused by their family. Indoctrina-
tion, while often quite subtle, is nonetheless powerful.
Nor can we assume that curricular challenges mounted by dissenting
parents are necessarily a manifestation of intolerance toward the presentation
of all other views, if by "tolerant" we mean the dictionary definition of
"showing understanding or leniency for conduct or ideas... conflicting with
one's own."12 Arguably, parents who seek individualized accommodation by
opting-out are in fact demonstrating tolerance for the views of others by not
seeking the broader remedy of completely eliminating the offensive program
or materials."m One can be tolerant of diverse views without adopting them
or foregoing one's own convictions. The harm that some parents may fear is
that exposure to views antithetical to their religious or moral beliefs may lead
their impressionable children to adopt "false beliefs" and act in conformity
with those beliefs, committing "moral error. "" For conservative Jews in
New York City, for example, the distribution of condoms in the public schools
without a parental opt-out provision could cause their children to act in
violation of a basic tenet of their faith requiring sexual abstinence outside of
231. 827 F.2d 1058, 1066 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); id. at 1070
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
232. See Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (supporting "tolerance of diverse
... religious views" as a value fundamental to democratic government and to be inculcated through
public schooling); see also WEBSIER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTlONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1986).
233. Burt, supra note 186, at 64 (arguing that parents object to their child being exposed to
materials that "offend their religious beliefs not because of some reflexive intolerance to the presentation
of other views, but because they do not want their child corrupted by a premature or improperly
mediated introduction to other forms of religion and to the feelings, attitudes and values of other
students") (internal citation omitted).
234. John H. Garvey, Cover Your Ears, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 761, 766 (1993) (discussing
types of harm that students can suffer due to school prayer as compared to curriculum exposure).
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marriage. This is not to deny that some religious parents, as the facts in Mozert
indicate, may object to an idea of religious tolerance that respects religious
diversity." However, we cannot assume that all parents who raise religious
objections to the curriculum are as extreme or non-mainstream in their views
as the Mozert parents.
There is undoubtedly a paradox in the value of tolerance itself. True
tolerance requires accommodation of or at least respect for other points of
view, including opposing views whose commitments preclude tolerance. 6
Dissenting parents can reasonably argue that a curriculum neutrally required
of all, yet fashioned according to majority views or values, is threatening and
therefore intolerant of their culture or values. In fact, there is no neutral
ground between these opposing positions. 7
Finally, we must consider the concept of religious speech as viewpoint. The
Supreme Court appears to have set upon a course of expanding the right to
private or individual religious expression on school property. Over the past
thirty years many schools have prohibited any expression of religious belief on
school grounds. 8 However, the notion of religion as a defining experience
in the lives of many children is gaining broader public recognition. 9 To
235. See Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools, 582 F. Supp. at 202. One of the selections
challenged by the parents in Mozert was The Diary of Anne Frank where Anne explains to her friend
Peter Van Doan what religion means to her. "I don't mean you have to be Orthodox... or believe in
heaven and hell and purgatory and things... Ijust mean some religion.., it doesn't matter what. Just
to believe in something!" From the plaintiffs' viewpoint, this passage was objectionable because it
encourages tolerance for religious diversity. For a discussion of the specific claims made by the
plaintiffs in Mozert and supported by their expert witnesses, see JOAN DEL FATrORE, WHAT JOHNNY
SHOULDN'T READ: TEXTBOOK CENSORSHIP IN AMERICA 61-75 (1992).
236. Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, in COMPARATIVE
CONSIrrUrTIONAL FEDERALISM 77, 92 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990) (suggesting that concept of tolerance
be replaced by substantive theory of oppression which raises issue of "power implicit in the competition
between points of view about tolerance"); see also Stolzenburg, supra note 186, at 584 (noting "paradox
of tolerance for the intolerant" in context of fundamentalists' calls in Mozert to eliminate tolerance from
public schools).
237. Minow, supra note 236.
238. See Fischer, supra note 229, at 347 (arguing that Supreme Court cases have been
misinterpreted; the Court has only found Establishment Clause violations in situations involving "state-
directed religious activity" and never with regard to individual student acting on her own) (citing Illinois
ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (striking down on-premises religious
training); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 431 (1962) (striking down required school prayer); School Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down required Bible reading); Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (striking down required posting of the Ten Commandments); Wallace
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 39 (1985) (striking down required moment-of-silence for meditation or voluntary
prayer); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1986) (striking down required teaching of creation
science); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 583 (1992) (striking down state-directed graduation prayer)).
Conversely, many school districts have violated the Supreme Court's proscription against organized
prayer. See KENNETH M. DOLBEARE & PHILLIP E. HAMMOND, THE SCHOOL PRAYER DECISIONS (1971)
(documenting widespread violations in five communities within Midwestern state in late 1960s); PEOPLE
FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, RELIGION IN NORTH CAROLINA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1983) (finding similar
violations throughout North Carolina).
239. See infra notes 250-254 and accompanying text (discussing recent efforts to achieve consensus
on role of religion in public schools).
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deny them the opportunity to express a religious perspective in the course of
their educational experience forces them to repress a fundamental part of their
existence.' ° For example, should an elementary school student be permitted
to select a topic such as "The Power of God" for an independent research
project and make an oral presentation to the class?" Should a second grade
student be permitted to show a videotape to her classmates during "show and
tell" that presents her singing a religious song? 2 Should a junior high school
student be permitted to select "The Life of Christ" as the topic of a research
paper? 3 Lower courts in recent years have answered negatively to all three
questions, finding no violation of free speech rights. These decisions reflect a
widely held view that there is something fundamentally different about religious
topics that distinguishes them markedly from politically charged secular topics
such as communism, capitalism, immigration policies, gay rights, and even
abortion. These too are topics on which individuals may have sharply divergent
and deeply held views; yet they are commonly addressed in the school setting,
particularly by secondary school students.'
Nevertheless, let us assume that the courts are constitutionally correct in
protecting school children from potential religious, as opposed to political,
indoctrination by their peers. Then the nature and the context of the expression
are most significant. Key factors to be considered include the degree of state
official involvement or direction, the age of the students, and whether the
religious expression demands a response from a captive student audience. It
may be permissible for students to proselytize their religious views during non-
class hours such as at lunchtime in the cafeteria or in the schoolyard. u5 The
question inevitably arises, however, as to whether religious speech by students
in the course of classroom activities where students are constructively
"captive" may have a proselytizing effect on other students.
240. An analogy can be drawn here with the manner in which schools in the late nineteenth through
the mid-twentieth century not only failed to acknowledge the ethnic heritage of foreign-born students,
but forced them to affirmatively reject it.
241. See Duran ex. rel. Duran v. Nitsche, 780 F. Supp 1048 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (upholding teacher's
decision that student give oral presentation only before her and not in presence of other students).
242. See DeNooyer v. Livonia Public Schools, 799 F. Supp. 744 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (restricting
second grader's presentation to classmates).
243. See Settle v. Dickson County School Bd., 53 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 518 (1996) (upholding grade of zero awarded to student paper on life of Jesus Christ).
244. See Kamenshine, supra note 73, at 1137 (suggesting that implicit in First Amendment Free
Speech Clause is political establishment prohibition closely analogous to religious establishment
prohibition requiring that schools provide balanced treatment of various political viewpoints).
245. See Sekulow, Henderson, & Tuskey, supra note 211, at 1023 (arguing that "lpirotected
religious speech also includes speech designed to persuade or to win converts to one's religious beliefs-
so called 'proselytizing' speech."); John W. Whitehead, Avoiding Religious Apartheid:Affording Equal
Treatment for Student-Initiated Religious Expression in Public Schools, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 229, 245-46
(1989) (arguing that "[a] great deal of First Amendment jurisprudence was formed through individual
attempts, notwithstanding governmental restrictions, to persuade, recruit, or proselytize others to a
particular political, social, or religious view").
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The Supreme Court has noted the potentially coercive environment of the
school setting.' To be sure, the dangers of coercion progressively decrease
as one moves up the grades from elementary through middle school and high
school. Older students are more secure in their own views and less susceptible
to influence. Even at the high school level where students respond to peer
pressure, they are unlikely to be influenced by an isolated expression of
religion by an individual classmate. However, where a group of classmates
joins together to express a religious perspective on an otherwise secular topic,
there is a risk of peer pressure which may lead to school endorsement. Such
student-organized, as compared with individual, religious speech need not
necessarily induce non-adherents to change their beliefs. The harm, as Justice
O'Connor has aptly noted, is that it creates a dichotomy between insiders and
outsiders within the political community of the school. 7 This concern arises
particularly where the religious speakers are in the majority and the expression
is made in a school-sponsored activity under the direction of a member of the
school staff. For example, while it may be permissible for one or several
students to present independent reports on the life of Christ to fulfill a course
requirement, a similar presentation made by a group of students, particularly
where they represent the dominant religious view, may prove coercive. One
can also draw a clear distinction between an independent research project or
oral presentation on a religious theme which merely represents the expression
of personal views and a student survey of religious views. The latter may cause
students to engage in religious soul-searching and to question their own family-
directed religious beliefs.
B. Moving Toward Consensus
The many nuances of the religious speech question have created confusion
and inconsistency among school districts across the country. Over the past
decade, the concept of "equal access" for religious speech' together with
246. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). In Weisman, the Court struck down a public
school's inclusion of "nonsectarian" prayer in a school graduation ceremony as violating the Establish-
ment Clause, noting that "there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from
subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.... What to most believers
may seem nothing more than a reasonable request that the nonbeliever respect their religious practices,
in a school context may appear to the nonbeliever or dissenter to be an attempt to employ the machinery
of the State to enforce a religious orthodoxy." Id. at 586.
247. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring) ("Endorsement
sends a message to non-adherents that they or outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community. Disapproval sends the opposite message."); see Nadine Strossen, A Discussion ofReligion's
Role in the Classroom, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 607, 624 (1995) (citing statement made by
plaintiff in phone interview subsequent to Supreme Court decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 557
(1992), that "When I am forced to participate in a ritual... it's an attempt to make me different from
what I am-to change my identity to make me conform.").
248. See supra note 205 and accompanying text discussing the Equal Access Act of 1984.
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the Court's more recently defined approach to religious speech as viewpoint or
perspective 49 have opened this ongoing debate to wide reconsideration.
Broad-based coalitions of religious leaders, educational organizations, and
advocacy groups are now joining together to find a common ground on the role
of religion and religious speech in the public schools.
In the summer of 1994, Protestant and Jewish leaders issued a four-page
document on church-state issues which was presented to Vice President Al
Gore in a White House ceremony. While this manifesto clearly declares a
commitment to separation of church and state and denounces organized prayer
in the schools, it also supports voluntary private prayer and religious
expression such as Bible reading and discussion of religious faith among
students. In other words, public schools "may not promote a religious
perspective but may protect the religious exercise of students. "'o
In March 1994, eighteen organizations ranging from the Christian Coalition
to People for the American Way adopted a statement of six principles on
"Religious Liberty, Public Education, and the Future of American Demo-
cracy," pledging to "soften the tone of their rhetoric and demonstrate respect
for one another's views.""' The following month, a more substantive
statement was issued by a diverse group of organizations in an attempt to
clarify the current state of the law." 2 The statement confirms the right of
students to "express their religious beliefs in the form of reports, homework
and artwork," to make "religious or anti-religious remarks in the ordinary
course of classroom discussions or student presentations," and to "distribute
religious literature to their classmates" on an equal basis as non-religious
literature. The statement also allows that schools can teach sexual abstinence
and contraception, but this is subject to a qualified legally protected right of
students to be excused from objectionable aspects of the curriculum. It further
permits the teaching of specific values including "the dual virtues of moral
249. See supra Part I.C.
250. A Shared Vision: Religious Liberty in the Twenty-First Century, LiBERTY, Mar./Apr. 1995,
at 18.
251. The six principles included the following: (1) Religious Liberty for All; (2) The Meaning of
Citizenship; (3) Public Schools Belong to All Citizens; (4) Religious Liberty and Public Schools; (5) The
Relationship Between Parents and Schools; and (6) Conduct of Public Disputes. Noticeably absent from
the list of endorsers were groups that have played an active role in litigation on these issues including
the American Civil Liberties Union, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, the
American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress and such conservative groups as the
American Family Foundation, Focus on Family, and the Rutherford Institute. Representatives of some
of these groups "found the principles so noncontroversial as to be worth little in reducing real conflicts."
Mark Walsh, Truce Sought in School Wars Over Religion, EDUC. WK., Mar. 29, 1995, at 1, 10.
252. While not intended as a statement of consensus on these issues, the document addresses some
of the more controversial topics in an even-handed way. Such conciliation would ordinarily prove
troublesome to various members of the signatory group who have asserted contrary positions in litigation
before the courts.
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conviction and tolerance. " "s Again, this is not a statement of consensus on
what the law should be but rather what the law currently is. Still, the dialogue
from which this statement emerged represents a significant step toward the
possibility of ultimately reaching some common understanding of the role of
religion in the schools. It also represents a decided shift in the debate from the
bipolar views of strict separationists and conservative accommodationists
toward a middle ground that leans more toward the accommodationist end than
would have been politically predictable even two years ago.
That shift was confirmed by Executive action when President Clinton
endorsed the foregoing manifesto, calling on the Secretary of Education and the
Attorney General to develop guidelines on religion in the schools to be
distributed to the nation's 15,000 school districts. This memorandum represents
a stronger endorsement of religious expression in the schools-stopping short
of organized prayer-than perhaps any official statement in recent history. The
President noted that "nothing in the First Amendment converts our public
schools into religion-free zones or requires all religious expression to be left
at the schoolhouse door." '
C. Preserting Our Common and Uncommon Values
These efforts to find a common ground on the role of religious speech in
public schools are a significant first step toward recognizing diverse values in
the schools. Nevertheless, they address only a narrow aspect of the educational
values dilemma, an aspect that is relatively easy to resolve when viewed
against the broad spectrum of values-based controversies. The acceptance of
253. REUGION IN THE PuBLIc SCHOOLS: A JOINT STATEMENT OF CURRENT LAW, Apr. 1995, was
drafted by the American Jewish Congress, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewish
Committee, the American Muslim Council, the Anti-Defamation League, the Baptist Joint Committee,
the Christian Legal Society, the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, the National
Association of Evangelicals, the National Council of Churches, People for the American Way, and the
Union of American Hebrew Congregations and endorsed by 23 additional organizations.
Noticeably absent from the endorsers were groups most closely aligned with the religious right,
including the Christian Coalition and the American Center for Law and Justice. Intended as a "statement
of consensus on current law as an aid to parents, educators and students" despite adverse positions taken
by some of these organizations in litigation, the statement covers student prayers, graduation prayer and
baccalaureates, official participation or encouragement of religious activity, teaching about religion,
student assignments and religion, distribution of religious literature, religious persuasion versus religious
harassment, the Equal Access Act, religious holidays, excusal from religiously-objectionable lessons,
teaching values, student garb, and released time.
254. Text of President Clinton's Memorandum on Religion in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1995,
at B10. According to the Wall Street Journal, "Mhis was a large statement by a U.S. President, and
it got very close to the heart of what ails the nation.... If Ronald Reagan had said [the same thing]
about the social worth of simple religious belief in 1982, they would have laughed him off the TV
screens. This is 1995, and no one's laughing anymore." Editorial, Nihilism, Religion and the President,
WALL ST. J., July 14, 1995, at A12; see also Letter from Richard W. Riley, U.S. Secretary of
Education, to Superintendents of Schools (Aug. 10, 1995) (letter sent on directive of President Clinton
in consultation with Attorney General to superintendent of every school district in America, providing
statement of principles that addresses extent to which religious expression and activity are permitted in
American public schools) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
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individual non-school-sponsored religious speech in the public schools demands
a change in attitudes, albeit a significant change given pervasive views on
religion in the schools. Questions addressing the school curriculum per se,
however, not only demand attitudinal changes and institutional acquiescence but
further suggest affirmative steps toward broad-based structural reform. These
are the hard questions facing educational reformers, legal and political
commentators, and the courts.
This carries the analysis back to the fundamental question posed at the
beginning of this discussion. In a pluralist society that recognizes rights to
freedom of conscience and belief (and also prohibits an established church),
how can education promote a national identity while at the same time preserve
community and individual interests? The proposed framework for developing
a response is directed at balancing individual rights to autonomy, the collective
interests of the larger society, and community culture, while simultaneously
recognizing contemporary political and demographic realities. Two approaches
are considered. The first examines the question of parental accommodation in
the current system of state-operated and funded schools. The second examines
the concept of parental autonomy and choice through non-traditional proposals
which are gaining political support-proposals that radically restructure
educational governance in America.
1. Fundamental Premises
Each proposal is based on certain fundamental premises. The first
recognizes that society publicly funds education for two primary purposes:
national definition and national perpetuation. These collective purposes depend
upon a common set of core values, public aspirations, culture, and tradition
that bind the citizens together despite peripheral differences. The second
premise recognizes that, despite assertions to the contrary from the
"multicultural" and "values clarification" camps, such a shared set of core
values is not only ascertainable but can be inculcated, along with values that
represent the culture of a given community, through both direct instruction and
the "hidden curriculum" that pervades the educational process. While our
traditions draw on the contributions of our multicultural past, we are not a
nation of diverse disconnected cultures. We share a certain "cultural tradition,"
along with its history, ideals, and symbols, that holds us together in our
diversity. 5 The third premise is that, given the current educational structure
of government funding, public schools should maintain a position of "neutrali-
ty" toward religion, neither directly inculcating religious values per se nor
255. Diane Ravitch, Multiculturalsm: E Pluribus Plures, 59 AM. SCHoLAR 337, 340 (1990)
(arguing that presentation of history, for example, must not become so particularized as to negate
common culture that binds us together).
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denying their existence and their fundamental role in the moral and psychologi-
cal lives of certain students. Fourth is a recognition of community and the key
role that schools play in articulating community values so long as those values
do not conflict with certain core values which give us common purpose as a
nation. 5 6
2. Accommodation Within the Current System: A Modest Proposal
As litigation over educational dissent illustrates, calls for accommodation
spring from clashes in values. Before evaluating accommodation as a
mechanism for resolving such conflict, however, the scope, limitations, and
potential misinterpretations of this project must be explained. The proposal set
forth below distinguishes between national or core values that reflect a
nationwide consensus, and local or community values that reflect a consensus
within a given community. This is not to confuse core values with the concept
of a national curriculum or nationally defined subject-area standards, the latter
being the topic of intense debate within and beyond educational circles
nationwide.' A curriculum presents defined subject matter, based on certain
pedagogical goals and underlying values. When imposed as a national standard
or requirement, such a curriculum inevitably evokes criticism across the
political spectrum as an impermissible intrusion into state and community
control over education. Values, on the other hand, as Pierre Schlag defines
them, are "abstract idealizations cast as context-transcendent, regulative
grounds.... [Values] establish the shared identities and sell-definitions [within
a community] that make dialogue and deliberation possible.... [They] serve
to identify and circumscribe the ... decisions that can be reached by a
community or its members.""' In the following analysis, values are viewed
as shared ideals or political and social commitments to be reflected throughout
the school experience and particularly through the formal curriculum. Common
values emerge through consensus in policy choices, rather than from being
imposed and enforced by an outside authority, e.g., the state or the federal
government, as in the case of uniform curriculum standards.
Any attempt to identify a core of shared values runs the risk of appearing
as no more than an abstract, subjective, feel-good "bag of virtues." However,
in order to develop the concept of accommodation while maintaining the
256. See AmI ErziON, THE SPIRrT OF COMMUNrrY 135 (1993) (arguing that institutions such
as schools, local churches and museums "are important for communities above and beyond the services
they provide. Communities congeal around such institutions."); ROBERT N. BELLAH, HABITS OF THE
HEART 282 (1985) (noting that schools, among other institutions, "communicate a form of life, a
paideia, in the sense of growing up in a morally and intellectually intelligible world").
257. See MASSARO, supra note 43, at 153 (suggesting that national curriculum should stress
knowledge for citizenship, including baseline literacy and historical knowledge and also "a rich
appreciation of our conflicts and pluralism").
258. Pierre Schlag, Values, 6 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 219, 220-21 (1994).
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fundamental purposes of the educational enterprise, one has to identify some
bottom line of commonalities below which the recognition of idiosyncratic
views cannot fall.1 9 Although not intended to be exhaustive, a listing of
common values might include a mix of character traits such honesty, integrity,
responsibility, delayed gratification, hard work, respect for authority, and civic
virtue combined with more fundamental political principles, particularly justice
and fairness, political and religious tolerance, and equality in the sense of equal
dignity for all. As a source of these "shared values," we should look to our
common history and particularly to the United States Constitution, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court, and to federal statutory law with supporting
administrative regulations as statements of majority consensus.'
The equality principle is a good example from which to draw some insights
into the nuances of, and potential stumbling blocks within, this approach. The
most consistent justification for equality as a moral precept has rested on the
belief of humans qua humans, from the Stoics who based their egalitarian
principles on the natural equality of humans as rational beings, to the New
Testament doctrine of equality of all souls in the sight of God, to the
Declaration of Independence proclamation "that all men are created Equal, that
they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights. " 16s As a
result, there is an anti-discrimination principle within equality that transcends
culture. Nevertheless, despite the general consensus that individuals should
treat other individuals with equal dignity and respect, there is less agreement
as to the degree to which equal treatment should be required and enforced as
a matter of law, and whether the government should take affirmative steps to
achieve substantive, and not just formal, equality for certain groups in society.
Few would disagree that racial equality in the sense of formal equality or
equal treatment (as compared with substantive equality, which may require
affirmative action and preferential treatment) is a principle upon which majority
consensus exists as reflected in legal doctrine. The Supreme Court has
articulated a higher level of judicial scrutiny for examining classifications based
on race under the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause.262 Con-
259. See Sherry, supra note 228, at 177 (suggesting that moral character, which is conducive to
republican citizenship, includes inclination to act in accordance with relatively uncontested "cultural
norms" such as individual responsibility, honesty, hard work, tolerance, and similar values, while
"contested norms on such things as sexuality, religious beliefs, or gender roles" would be left to
republican deliberation).
260. For a similar line of reasoning drawing on statutes, regulations, and executive orders as
sources of national public policy and as evidence of the nation's fundamental commitment to the
principle of racial equality, see Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592-95 (1983).
261. ROSEMARY C. SALOMONE, EQUAL EDUCATION UNDER LAW 17 (1986) (citing Equality, Moral
and Social, in TmE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 39 (Paul Edwards ed., 1972)).
262. This heightened level of scrutiny requires that the classification be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling governmental interest. The Court has applied this standard of review in two
categories of cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: first, when
a fundamental right is at stake; and second, when the government classifies persons upon some suspect
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gress has enacted a comprehensive body of statutory law prohibiting racial
discrimination in a vast array of human endeavors, including education,'
employment,' and public accomniodations.' These laws are supported by
the administrative regulations of various federal agencies.' Finally, need we
remind ourselves, this country fought a civil war over racial equality.
In contrast, the national consensus on equality for women is more culturally
complex. Numerous federal statutes and regulations promoting gender equality
in education and employment exist.8 The Supreme Court has defined
a more exacting level of scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause for state actions that classify individuals on the basis of
gender, albeit a somewhat lower standard than applied to racial classifica-
tions. 9 Furthermore, most Americans would agree to an anti-discrimination
principle with regard to women's rights, and so this principle might be placed
within our common "core" values.
Nevertheless, gender equality, unlike racial equality or equality for the
disabled, raises the more controversial issue of gender roles and lifestyle
choices. There is ambiguous evidence of a national consensus to replace
traditional roles for men and women with gender-neutral roles or roles freely
adopted as a matter of individual choice. The distinction between women as
professionals in traditional male-dominated careers and women as homemakers
basis, such as race. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3 (John E.Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda eds., 5th ed.
1995); see, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down state anti-miscegenation statute).
263. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d states: "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance."
264. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
265. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a states: "All persons shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and
accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination
or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."
266. E.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1, grants rulemaking and
enforcement powers to federal administrative agencies empowered to extend financial assistance to any
program or activity. The former Department of Health, Education and Welfare subsequently promulgat-
ed regulations pursuant to the Act which are now enforced by the Department of Education. 34 C.F.R.
§100.8(a) (1995).
267. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 states:
(a) No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
Title IX protects both students and employees of covered educational institutions. North Haven Bd. of
Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1996).
268. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, supra note 264.
269. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (applying intermediate standard of judicial
review to gender classifications, whereby "[classifications by gendermust serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to the achievement of those objectives").
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and caretakers, as well as the notion of free choice between the two, are
subject to considerable debate. Much of the debate takes place among certain
conservative religious groups who consider the traditional dichotomy between
male and female spheres as critical to the preservation of family life.
Disagreement on this issue in the school setting has arisen in the context of role
models, particularly of women, presented in curricular materials. The
acceptability of this aspect of the gender equality value, therefore, may work
more effectively as a local value, rather than a national one.
There is even less evidence of consensus over homosexual rights. The
Supreme Court has been unwilling to extend privacy rights under the
Constitution to homosexual acts, 270 nor are there federal statutory or adminis-
trative protections for homosexuals. Various states27 and municipalities2'
have enacted anti-discrimination statutes protecting homosexual rights, but
these are a manifestation not of national but of state or local consensus.
This is not to deny the operation here of the anti-discrimination aspect of
270. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
271. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §51.7 (West 1995), Freedom from Violence or Intimidation, which
states:
(a) All persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence,
or intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property because of
their race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, sexual
orientation, age, disability, or position in a labor dispute, or because another person perceives
them to have one or more of those characteristics.
But see COLO. CONST. art. 1, § 30b (West 1995), No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian
or Bisexual Orientation, which states:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its
agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt, or
enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of,
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall
be in all respects self-executing.
See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335 (Colo. 1994), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995) (challenging
constitutionality of Article H1 § 30b of the Colorado Constitution which the Colorado voters adopted
through the initiative process in 1994).
272. See, e.g., Los ANGELES, CAL., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. IV. art.12, §§ 49.70-49.80 (1979)
which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to hire, or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment on the basis (in whole or in part)
of such individual's sexual orientation.
See also NEW YORK Crry ADmiN. CODE, Title 8, § 8-107 which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice:
(a) For an employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the actual or perceived
age, race, national origin, gender, disability, marital status, sexual orientation or alienage
or citizenship status of any person, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge
from employment such person or to discriminate against such person in compensation or
in terms, conditions or privileges of employment.
For a listing of statutes, ordinances, and executive orders prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation, see NAN D. HUNTER, SHERRYL E. MICHAELSON & THOMAS B. STODDARD, THE RIGHTS
OF LESBIANS AND GAY MEN, AN AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION HANDBOOK, App. C, 205-208
(1992).
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equality in terms of respecting the equal dignity of all individuals regardless of
personal characteristics. Nor is it suggested that tolerance for non-traditional
lifestyles should never be incorporated into the public school curriculum.
However, the discussion of controversial issues such as alternative lifestyles
should be left to community discretion as determined by a locally-based process
of reasoned deliberation and dialogue, whereby community members, including
parents and educators, join together to define those local values to be reflected
in the curriculum. 273 If individual parents find the chosen perspective
objectionable, one alternative is to allow students to "opt-out" of the challenged
instruction either by exempting them entirely, as some districts have done with
regard to AIDS education and sex education, sometimes under mandate of state
law, or by providing them with alternative instruction or materials as the
school district had originally done in Mozert. Obviously, the closer the
challenged program in which the non-core value is presented is to basic skill
development, such as reading, the greater the school's interest in providing
alternative instruction and not complete exemption. Conversely, the closer the
program is to matters traditionally addressed within the family, such as sex
education, the greater the family's interest in obtaining a complete exemption
as opposed to alternative instruction.
Courts have drawn a clear distinction between religious and secular claims,
deferring to the discretion of school officials in the face of parental challenges
based on secular beliefs. But even in the case of religious beliefs, accommoda-
tion is constitutionally required only within the narrow set of circumstances as
set forth in Yoder,274 and depends on the particular points of objection and
the delicate balancing of religious and administrative burdens. However, a
compelling argument can be made to broaden and more clearly define the class
of cases in which accommodation would be constitutionally mandated, drawing
on First Amendment free exercise with regard to religious claims and First
Amendment freedom of expression and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process in the case of both religious and secular claims. The first would
broaden Yoder's applicability to support the proposition that mere exposure to
offensive materials in some circumstances can burden the free exercise of
religious beliefs. The second would draw on the student's freedom of
conscience or belief implicit in Barnete275 along with parental rights to
273. See Michael A. Rebell, Schools, Values, and the Courts, 7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 275, 338-
42 (1989) (arguing that communities should engage in pluralistic dialogue to determine values to be
reflected in school curriculum); NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARD AS'N, CENSORSHIP: MANAGING THE
CONTROVERSY 63-80 (1989) (outlining suggestions and model school policies for resolving censorship
controversies); CHARLES C. HAYNES, FINDING COMMON GROUND BI-14 (1994) (providing sample
approaches and guidelines developed by various communities to address religion in the curriculum).
274. 406 U.S. 205 (1973).
275. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (striking down a compulsory flag salute statute under First Amendment
freedom of expression); see also Stephen Arons, Educational Choice as a Civil Rights Strategy, in
PUBLIC VALUES, PRIvATE SCHOOLS 70 (Neal E. Devins ed., 1989) (arguing that Barnette reinforces
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control the education of their children implicit in Meyer276 and Pierce.27
Once student or parental rights were established under any of these theories,
the burden would shift to school officials to justify their refusal to accommo-
date for reasons other than mere administrative inconvenience.
278
If the objection is related to a core value such as racial or religious
equality, then clearly there should be no constitutional right to accommodation.
Core values are so central to the preservation of democratic government and
so basic to the constitutional enterprise that they do not lend themselves to
governmental accommodation. On the other hand, what about dissenting
parents who raise curricular challenges to non-core values based on either
religious or philosophical grounds, such as parents who espouse a modem-day
view of a woman's role in a community wherein the majority has chosen a
more traditional perspective to be reflected in the curriculum? Or parents who
want their children taught tolerance for gays and lesbians in a community
where the majority has voted such tolerance down? Or parents who object to
family life programs? Do they have a constitutional right to accommodation?
If the objection is to a non-core local community value which by definition is
peripheral and discretionary, the school should make every effort to accommo-
date the parents within the bounds of reasonable administrative capabilities and
sound pedagogy. If the challenged instruction or materials do not merely
expose children to ideas that their parents find offensive or disagreeable but
could potentially induce children to engage in behavior that has serious social,
psychological, or physical consequences as in the case of condom distribution,
then the justification for accommodation becomes even more compelling.279
Another alternative would be to remove the offensive materials completely
from the curriculum. However, as Smith' and other similar cases demon-
strate, federal courts are justifiably reluctant to extract religious and moral
implications from materials and practices that are widely accepted as secular
by the larger society and by popular culture. An example would be objections
to the celebration of Halloween as promoting witchcraft in violation of the
principle articulated in Pierce that the First Amendment protects "the unencumbered communication of
individual and subcultural values"); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (holding that the
"First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority
and to refuse to foster... an idea they find morally objectionable").
276. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
277. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
278. The Parental Rights and Responsibilities Act, supra note 65, now working its way through
Congress, would provide parents with statutory rights to direct the upbringing of their children.
279. See Alfonso v. Fernandez, 606 N.Y.S.2d 259 (A.D. 2d Dept. 1993), appealdismissed without
op., 637 N.E.2d 279 (1994) (holding that condom distribution program that did not include opt-out
provision violated parents' substantive due process rights because it offered students means to engage
in action that contravened parental values).
280. 827 F.2d 684 (lth Cir. 1987).
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Establishment Clause.281 In such cases, accommodation is not constitutionally
required. In fact, if materials are removed or practices discontinued for partisan
political reasons, this may raise the specter of censorship in violation of the
First Amendment Free Speech Clause. School officials who remove educational
materials from the curriculum or modify the school program based on
politically or religiously motivated opposition to the ideas expressed, and not
based on legitimate pedagogical concerns, may violate the First Amendment
rights of other students.'
3. Restructuring for Parental Choice: A More Radical Proposal
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, accommodating individual
parental values within the current educational structure merely permits
accommodation of parental objections on the margins. Constrained by the very
purposes of common schooling itself, this modest approach fails to resolve the
layers of conceptual, constitutional, and administrative conflicts that emerge
from attempts to unfold and resolve the educational values question.
An alternative approach is offered here not as a definitive model for
immediate and complete dismantling of the current educational system, but as
a suggested framework for guiding policy analysis and debate toward a more
effective resolution of these conflicts. This approach examines the educational
values question within the broader policy discussion of parental autonomy and
school choice. In the policy arena, these two discussions typically take place
in parallel fashion, intersecting only occasionally and peripherally. Yet the
connection between the two is almost self-evident. In fact, proposals for
dramatically restructuring educational governance in this country may provide
the most effective mechanism for balancing individual, community, and societal
interests inherent in the values debate.
There are many permutations on the "choice" theme. However, a wave of
state and local initiatives designed to free public schools from burdensome
regulations, combined with national debate over educational vouchers to be
granted to parents of private school students, are presently leading us slowly
toward a radical reconfiguration of schooling in America. Both ultimately view
parental choice as a means to improving the quality of the educational program
and thereby enhancing student performance. If we carry this movement to an
extreme yet logical conclusion, one illustrative model for preserving a richer
281. Guyer v. School Bd. of Alachua County, 634 So. 2d. 806 (1st Dist. Fla. 1994) (rejecting
claim that depiction of witches, cauldrons, and brooms included in public school decorations as part of
Halloween celebration were religious symbols and therefore had effect of endorsing or promoting
religion in violation of the Establishment Clause).
282. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273 (holding that school officials may control school-sponsored
speech if based on "legitimate pedagogical concerns"); Epperson, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (holding that state
statute forbidding teaching of evolution in public schools and colleges violated the Free Exercise
Clause).
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sense of liberty of conscience and belief through schooling might include a mix
of three formats to be permitted under operable state education statutes:
publicly funded and operated government schools in their current form; what
has come to be known as "charter" schools' funded directly by the state but
under the management of outside groups; and private schools, including
religiously affiliated institutions, funded through a combination of private
tuition and voucher payments provided by the state to parents who demonstrate
economic need.' In other words, the state would grani "scholarships to the
poor" in the form of tuition vouchers that could be redeemed at participating
private schools if accepted as full tuition payment. An alternate approach might
provide vouchers to parents on a sliding scale of economic need with the result
that parents at the extreme low end of the economic continuum might pay no
tuition while others might pay varying differential amounts between a partial
voucher award and the full tuition cost.
Under this model, all participating schools, whether receiving direct or
indirect state aid, would be bound to incorporate into their curriculum core
values as set forth above. While the development of "character traits" such as
honesty and civic virtue admittedly are difficult to enforce, "political
principles" such as equality are already enforceable as a matter of law, against
schools that are directly and completely funded by the state, under federal
constitutional norms.' Participating schools that accept federal funds would
have to comply further with federal anti-discrimination statutes, prohibiting
283. Charter schools are autonomous public institutions, authorized under state legislation, that are
established under a contract between a group that manages a school and a sponsoring authority that
oversees it. The contractor might be a group of parents or teachers, a labor union, a college or
university or other nonprofit organization. The sponsor might be a school board, a state education
department, a state university campus, or a government agency. Typically charter schools are exempt
from significant state regulations or local rules that inhibit flexible management of public schools. They
exclude sectarian schools from participation and generally select students on the basis of a lottery. To
date, twenty states have enacted charter school legislation. See ALASKA STAT. § 140.03.250 (1995);
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-181 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-10-116 (Michie 1995); CAL. EDUC.
CODE § T. 2, D. 4, Pt. (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-30.5-101 (1996); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 14, Pt. I, Ch. 5 (1995); GA CODE ANN. § 20-2-255 (Michie 1995); HAW. REV. STAT. D. 1, T. 18,
Ch. 296, Pt. VIII (1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. Ch. 72, Art. 19 (1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3971
(1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71, § 89 (West 1996); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 380.511
(1995); MINN. STAT. § 120.064 (1995); 1995 N.H. LAWS 260; 1996 N.J. LAWS 426; N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-8A-1 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-77-4 (1995); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 12.101 (West
1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.40 (West 1995); WYO. STAT. § 21-3-201 (1995). At the federal level,
the Improving America's Schools Actof 1994, P.L. 103-382, § 10301 (1994), appropriated $15,000,000
for fiscal year 1995 to award grants to state educational agencies to conduct charter school programs
where allowed by state law.
284. For a general discussion of parental choice models, see Diane Ravitch & Joseph Viteritti, A
New Vision for City Schools, 122 PuB. INTERFsr 3 (1996).
285. This is not to suggest that schools that merely receive "indirect" state aid through vouchers
awarded to parents should be considered "state actors" and thereby subject to federal constitutional
claims broughtby students or employees under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Such an extension
of state action doctrine would serve as a disincentive for private schools to participate in a voucher
program. It is merely suggested that the curriculum of all participating schools reflect certain "core"
constitutional values or principles.
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discrimination on the basis of race, 6 gender,' and disabilities."s Non-
core values could be interpreted and applied according to the philosophy of the
particular school community. Student performance would be monitored by the
state, through standardized tests administered annually or at designated
benchmark periods to assure that schools were providing an adequate and
effective educational program. The state would provide transportation to all
three categories of schools within a radius of perhaps ten miles.
The option of privately funded schools would exist as it is now so long as
schools adhere to reasonable governmental regulations. Private schools
choosing not to participate in this comprehensive system of state supported
schools, perhaps to avoid regulation or because they reject a core value such
as religious equality, could continue to do so but without state funding beyond
that which is currently provided under federal and state programs, e.g., student
transportation and textbooks, 9 and educational services to educationally
disadvantaged students. 2' Parents obviously would be bound by geography.
If parents find unacceptable all the publicly funded options available within
their defined radius, as well as available non-state funded private alternatives,
they could engage in home schooling, educating their children at home, as long
as they comply with applicable state regulations, including teacher certification
requirements.
Such a diverse system resolves several of the problems that arise in the
more modest "accommodationist" proposal described in the previous
subsection. It permits parents to choose, from a variety of alternatives, the
school that best conveys their own value preferences whether religious or
philosophical, and thus largely avoids the value controversies that now exist in
the public schools. By removing the target for curricular challenges, litigation
would decrease, which in turn would disengage the courts from determining
education policy. The proposed system also promotes community interests,
286. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Supp. 1994), supra note 263.
287. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Supp. 1994), supra note
267.
288. § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 Supp. 1994); Individuals With
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1500 (Supp. 1994) (originally enacted as the Education
of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, 84 Stat. 175 (1970)).
289. According to a survey taken in the mid 1980s, 30 states provide assistance in the form of
transportation and/or textbooks and materials to students attending non-public schools, including
religiously affiliated schools. JOSEPH E. BRYSON & SAMUEL H. HOUSrON, THE SUPREME COURT AND
PUBLIC FUNDS FOR RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS: THE BURGER YEARS, 1969-1986, at 59.
290. See, e.g., Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, Pub. 1. No. 103-382 (amending the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20. U.S.C. §2701, and providing federal funds to
state and local educational agencies for educating disadvantaged children). Sec. 1120 of the Act provides
for the participation of children enrolled in private elementary and secondary schools requiring that:
[a] local educational agency shall ... provide such children, on an equitable basis, special
educational services or other benefits ... such as dual enrollment, educational radio and
television, computer equipment and materials, other technology, and mobile educational
services and equipment.
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where community is not necessarily defined geographically but religiously or
philosophically, whereby individuals can coalesce in groups to create mediating
institutions of education based on a shared world view.
This approach would provide true cultural diversity for individuals and
groups across the political and economic spectrum: for religious conservatives
who challenge the pervasively "secular" nature of public schooling, for
"multiculturalists" who challenge the pervasively "Eurocentric" nature of the
curriculum, and for others who embrace controversial perspectives such as
homosexual lifestyles or abortion rights. By providing vouchers for the
economically disadvantaged, the proposal inherently promotes the core value
of equality, permitting poor parents the discretion to direct the education and
upbringing of their children now available only to those of greater economic
means and further promotes the value of religious tolerance by permitting the
participation of religiously affiliated schools that agree to comply with certain
principles and standards.
This tripartite system further permits school officials to develop a
comprehensive curriculum including core and selected non-core values
reflecting a "coherent moral-cultural perspective." 29"' This not only avoids the
curricular fragmentation arguably created by attempts at accommodation under
the present approach but also prevents the psychological fragmentation of
students whose fundamental religious and moral values must now be left at the
schoolhouse door. On the other hand, by requiring that all three categories of
participating schools present core values throughout the instructional process
as well as the "hidden curriculum," the proposed model assures that we
preserve certain democratic principles and cultural commitments which bind us
together as a nation.
The various voucher proposals currently under consideration at the
national2" and state' 9e levels indicate that the concept of educational choice
291. See McConnell, supra note 82, at 151 (arguing for "genuine multicultural approach to
education, based on parental choice and control"); see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Using PFrivate Schools
to Promote Public Values, 1991 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 171 (supporting vouchers for poor and minority
students). But see David Futterman, School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law and Politics of
Public Aid to Private Schools, 81 GEO. L.J. 711 (1993) (arguing that while tuition vouchers are likely
to be found constitutional by the Supreme Court, they violate the fundamental principles of the
Establishment Clause).
292. See supra note 64 (discussing proposed Low-Income School Choice Demonstration Act of
1995).
293. In June 1995, Ohio and Wisconsin were the first states to enact legislation approving vouchers
for children who attend religious schools. The Ohio statute authorizes the allocation of vouchers of up
to $2,500 to students from mostly low-income families in Cleveland beginning with the 1996-97 school
year. OfHo REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.975 (Anderson 1995). The Wisconsin law expands Milwaukee's
five-year old program of private-school choice, providing vouchers of $3,600, to include religiously
affiliated schools and increases the number of participating students to 15,000 in 1996-97. To qualify
for the program, families must have an annual income of less than $26,000. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23
(West 1990), as amended by 1995 WIs. LAWS § 4002. Similar programs have been under legislative
consideration in other states, including Pennsylvania (defeated in June 1995), Minois, Indiana, and
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is slowly and incrementally becoming a reality. Yet it is not without its
detractors. Opponents voice concerns that choice programs will foster further
racial segregation and economic stratification in the schools, promote fraud and
waste in a proliferation of poorly managed and educationally inadequate private
and charter schools, and create overregulation of private schools, thereby
eroding their distinctive nature and even threatening the religious integrity of
sectarian schools.2' However, as noted by Stephen Sugarman, one of the
original architects of the concept of vouchers for the poor,s these criticisms
merely affirm the safeguards that must be built into a choice plan, including
guaranteed access to all students, parent outreach and information programs,
and consumer protections, rather than the desirability of choice itself.2
Besides, if religious schools in particular were to lose their distinction by
compromising their religious values in order to benefit from government
funding, that loss would be a matter of institutional choice rather than one
imposed upon them by government. Undoubtedly, some private religious
schools would continue to refuse government aid, even indirect aid such as that
offered through voucher payments, in order to preserve their distinctly
religious values.
Choice proposals fly directly in the face of the common school emphasis
on homogeneity and governmental control. They further extricate us from the
time warp of conventional attempts to resolve the curriculum-values dilemma
through a patchwork of grudging accommodations. While these are highly
Arizona. See Drew Lindsay, Wisconsin, Ohio Back Vouchers for Religious Schools, EDUC. WK., July
12, 1995 at 1; Ravitch & Viteritti, supra note 284, at 9-10.
In March 1995, the federal court in Wisconsin upheld the original Wisconsin Choice Program
against a challenge brought by low-income parents and school-children claiming that the plan's failure
to include religiously affiliated schools denied those who preferred such schools their rights under the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court held that the inclusion of religious schools with "unrestricted payments flowing
directly to [such] schools" would violate the Establishment Clause. Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp.
1209, 1214 (E.D. Wis. 1995), vacated and remanded, 68 F.3d 163 (1995) (citing Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)). The Seventh Circuit vacated and
remanded the judgment with instructions to dismiss the litigation as moot based on the subsequent statute
including religious school students in the program and the plaintiffs' intervention in the state case
challenging the inclusion. In enacting the expanded statute, the Wisconsin legislature provided for
vouchers to be awarded directly to parents who would then use them to defray the cost of tuition at
private schools of their choice, similar to the Minnesota tax deduction program upheld in Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), thereby hoping to avoid the constitutional impediment of direct payments
to religious schools noted by the district court several months previously in Miller. In a subsequent
round of litigation challenging the expanded program on federal and state constitutional grounds, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court enjoined implementation of those portions of the Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program that expanded the existing program to include sectarian schools, pending further order of the
court. Thompson v. Jackson, 95-2153-OA (Wis. Sup. Ct. Aug. 25, 1995) (order granting preliminary
injunction).
294. For a compelling argument opposing public aid to religiously affiliated schools, from a policy
and Establishment Clause perspective, see Steven K. Green, The LegalArgumentAgainstPrivate School
Choice, 62 U. CINN. L. REV. 37 (1993).
295. See JOHN E. COONS & STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, EDUCATION BY CHOICE (1978).
296. Sugarman, supra note 291, at 178-81.
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controversial proposals, they are gaining increased interest in the public policy
arena and may well shape the future of educational reform in this country.
Depending on the momentum these alternatives achieve and sustain in Congress
and particularly in state legislatures, as well as the response in the courts, the
concept of parental choice, if permitted to evolve incrementally over time
through trial and error, can potentially sound the death knell for the common
school as it has come to be known over the past century and a half. Whether
America can successfully regenerate and self-perpetuate without the mediating
structure of the common school, and continue to develop a common identity
and common aspirations, remains to be seen. That could be this nation's grand
experiment for the next millennium.
V. CONCLUSION
For the past century and a half, education in this country has operated
within the concept of the common school. In recent years, social, political, and
demographic factors have placed into serious question the continued vitality of
that concept. Dissenting parents have challenged with increasing frequency
various aspects of the school curriculum, taking their claims to court when
political and administrative processes have failed. The courts in turn have
struggled to balance individual rights and freedom of conscience against
collective interests in preserving democratic government and national identity.
Attempts to resolve this controversy through parental accommodation have
proven limited, and at times counterproductive. The time has come to stretch
beyond widely held over-generalizations regarding parental dissent and obsolete
notions of education and society inherited from the common school reformers
in order to explore alternative models of schooling that more effectively
accommodate individual and community preferences within the framework of
a shared common culture.

